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Introduction 
 
While Europe is facing a refugee crisis with millions of refugees and migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea in the last few years, the industry behind the migrant smuggling has 
become an extremely lucrative business. Escaping from war-torn countries that deal with 
widespread violence and highly repressive governments or out of poverty and in pursuit of 
better economic prospects, migrants from Africa and the Middle-East have increasingly found 
their way towards Europe. And according to Europol, because of the lack of legal ways of 
migration, almost 90% of them relied on services provided by migrant smugglers. They 
demand exorbitant amounts of money for each passage. It has made the smuggling industry a 
highly profitable business with profits exceeding those made by drug trafficking. But for the 
migrants it has resulted in extremely dangerous enterprises, with risks varying from being 
beaten to death in the safe houses in Libya, imprisonment for ransom in the Sahel dessert, the 
sell of their organs, sexual assault and dead by drowning in the Mediterranean Sea.1 
 
Clearly, steps have to be taken to bring the migrant smuggling industry to a halt. But although 
irregular migration flows heading towards the European mainland exist for a much longer 
period of time, it wasn’t until the refugee crisis reached unprecedented heights that the EU 
stepped up its efforts to respond to the crisis. A European Agenda on Migration was set up in 
May 2015.2 In the Agenda, the fight against migrant smugglers and traffickers was also 
mentioned as one of the main priorities and on 27 May 2015 the EU adopted the EU Action 
Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2015-2020).3 The action plan distinguished several ways to 
combat migrant smuggling, including ways to improve the prosecution of smugglers: by 
enhancing the capacities of EU member states to investigate and prosecute migrant smuggling 
networks, by strengthening the cooperation and coordination between law enforcement and 
judicial structures in the EU and with third countries of origin and transit and by improving 
the existing EU legal framework and the penal framework.4 Since then, the EU has already 
taken some steps to better identify and target the smuggling networks, as is shown by the 
launch of the military operation EUNAVFOR Med, also known as Operation Sophia, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These and other hardships encountered by migrants are extensively documented. See for example: Lucia Heisterkamp, “Tortured for 
ransom: extortion on migrant routes”, Open Democracy (12 October 2016); Nourhan Abdel Aziz, Paola Monzini, Ferruccio Pastore, The 
Changing Dynamics of Cross-border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean, New-Med research network (October 2015); 
Sahan Foundation and IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central 
Mediterranean Route (February 2016); Tuesday Reitano, Laura Adal and Mark Shaw, “Smuggled Futures: The dangerous path of the 
migrant from Africa to Europe”, Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime series on Human Trafficking (May 2014). 
2 European Commission, A European agenda on migration (13 may 2015). 
3 European Commission, EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 - 2020) (27 may 2015). 
4 Ibidem. 
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creation of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre at Europol and the establishment of the 
Thematic Group on Illegal Immigrant Smuggling at Eurojust. 
 
However, when it comes to the criminal investigations and the effective prosecution of 
migrant smugglers, the EU lags behind one EU member state in particular: Italy. The country 
operates at the frontline of the European migration crisis: it is one of the main ports of entry 
for migrants trying to reach Europe and at the moment it is also the only EU member state 
that prosecutes migrant smugglers active along the migration routes from North-Africa 
towards Italy.5 Over the last years, Italian prosecution offices have launched impressive large 
scale investigations and brought to trial hundreds of suspects who were placed on different 
levels within the criminal organisations: figures have been convicted that performed their 
smuggling activities on the high seas, in Italy or in North-European countries and 
international arrest warrants have been issued against some high mobsters who are mainly 
based in the African mainland. 
 
In their investigations, the prosecution offices of the country also receive assistance from a 
multitude of EU institutions. Europol has assisted the Italian investigations by analysing data 
collected by the Italian authorities, and Eurojust supported the cross-border cooperation 
between Italy and other EU member states by organising coordination meetings and 
facilitating the exchange of information and the execution of Letters of Request.6 Next to 
these well-known institutions, two other EU structures also support the Italian authorities: the 
two EU naval missions active in the Mediterranean Sea, Frontex-led Operation Triton and the 
military mission EUNAVFOR Med. They also conduct law enforcement activities and 
cooperate with the Italian authorities, but their contributions to the investigations have 
received much less attention.  
 
These developments of the last years show on the one hand that the EU tries to increase its 
efforts in combating the migrant smuggling business and that it also wants to give better 
support to the criminal investigations of EU member states. On the other hand, one EU 
member state is already conducting many criminal investigations on the smugglers for a 
number of years and with large successes. That raises the questions to what extent the EU can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Operation Commander Op SOPHIA (EEAS) Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino, EUNAVFOR MED - Operation SOPHIA Six Monthly 
Report, 22 June to 31 December 2015 (January 2016). 
6 Eurojust Press Release, “Eurojust and Europol support major operation against illegal immigrant smuggling” (6 September 2016); Eurojust 
Press Release, “Organised crime group behind illegal immigration dismantled” (23 November 2016). 
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learn from the Italian experience, and to what extent the EU can further improve the Italian 
investigations on migrant smuggling. Could the EU find ways to promote or legally allow the 
use of investigation methods in other EU member states that have proved to be efficient in 
Italy? And does the EU have the means to alleviate the difficulties that the Italian prosecutors 
encounter during their investigations? These aspects will be the focus of the thesis. It wants to 
give more clarity about how the EU can better support the migrant smuggling investigations 
of EU member states. In that way, the thesis wants to provide recommendations for an 
improved fight against migrant smuggling by the EU alongside the planned activities 
mentioned in the European Agenda on Migrant Smuggling. This study is aimed at answering 
the following central question:  
In which ways can the EU learn from the Italian practise and improve the investigation and 
prosecution of migrant smugglers by national law enforcement and judicial authorities?  
Two sub questions serve to answer the core question: 
- (1) how can the EU improve the investigations on migrant smuggling of EU member 
states, based on Italy’s good practises? 
- (2) how can the EU further support the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling, by 
improving the support of EU agencies? 
 
There are multiple way in which the EU can support the migrant smuggling investigations 
conducted by member states. The thesis will provide recommendations for two of these ways: 
(1) reinforcing the investigative capacities of the EU member states within their national 
jurisdictions, (2) strengthening the support of EU agencies for migrant smuggling 
investigations done by EU member states. In the first case, the EU can be of importance by 
improving the legislation and the investigation tools that national agencies have at their 
disposal. This can for example be done by disseminating best practises among the national 
authorities, by providing guidelines or adopting legislation about the use of investigation 
methods and by modifying the European penal framework. In the second case, the EU can be 
of assistance by directly improving the efficacy of EU agencies, such as Europol, Eurojust, 
Frontex and the European External Action Service (EEAS) – Operation Triton and Operation 
Sophia are launched respectively by Frontex and the EEAS. Examples of these are already 
mentioned above. 
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For finding out how to improve the EU’s legislation and the functioning of the EU agencies, 
the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling shall be looked upon as a case study. By 
analysing these investigations, it will become clear which methods used in Italy can best be 
taken over by the EU and other EU member states. And by looking at the cooperation 
between the Italian authorities and the EU agencies, it can be identified how the EU agencies 
can be more supportive. In that way, recommendations can be provided to the EU as to how 
to better support the anti-smuggling investigations of the EU member states. For that purpose, 
attention will be given to the instruments and methods used by Italian prosecutors and, due to 
the limited scope of the thesis, the thesis will be focussed on the cooperation between the 
Italian authorities and Operation Triton and Operation Sophia. 
 
Research on the investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers is particularly important 
because of the limited academic research on the topic. Save for some exceptions7, academic 
research has often assessed the EU’s fight against migrant smuggling by looking at all 
different policy tools and thereby regularly criticising their rather security-based approach 
instead of being more protection and justice based.8 Other studies are based on individual 
aspects of the EU’s policy framework to address migrant smuggling, such as the legal 
framework regarding the criminalisation of migrant smuggling and protection of victims9, or 
the cooperation with third countries.10 Case study research on the investigation and 
prosecution methods is also almost absent. That accounts in particular for the investigation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Some relevant research on this topic is conducted, see for example: Matilde Ventrella, “The impact of Operation Sophia on the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction against migrant smugglers and human traffickers”, QIL Zoom-in 30 (2016) 3-18 and Optimity Advisors, the 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), A study on 
smuggling of migrants; Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries, Study commissioned by the European 
Commission’s DG Migration and Home Affairs (September 2015). 
8 Ilse van Liempt, “A Critical Insight into Europe’s Criminalisation of Human Smuggling”, Sieps - Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (January 2016); Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guidl (eds.), “Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings: Policy 
dilemmas in the EU”, Centre for European Policy Studies (2016); Ruben Andersson, “Europe’s failed 'fight' against irregular migration: 
ethnographic notes on a counterproductive industry”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (4 January 2016); Anne T. Gallagher, 
“Exploitation in Migration: Unacceptable but Inevitable”, Journal of International Affairs 68 2 (2015); ARCI, “Steps in the process of 
externalisation of border controls to Africa, from the Valletta Summit to today”, ARCI analysis document (June 2016). 
9 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Ana Aliverti et. al., Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance to irregular migrants, Study commissioned by the European Commission DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee (2016); Optimity Advisors, ICMPD and ECRE, A study on 
smuggling of migrants. Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries; Joanne van der Leun and Anet van Schijndel, 
“Emerging from the shadows or pushed into the dark? The relation between the combat against trafficking in human beings and migration 
control”, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 44 (2016); European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs, Working document on tackling criminal smuggling, trafficking and labour exploitation of irregular migrants (19 October 2015); 
Louise Shelley, “Human Smuggling and Trafficking into Europe: A Comparative Perspective”, Migration Policy Institute (February 2014); 
A. Brunovskis and M. L. Skilbrei, “Two Birds with One Stone? Implications of conditional assistance in victim protection and prosecution of 
traffickers”, Anti-Trafficking Review 6 (2016). 
10 Alexander Bühler, Susanne Koelbl, Sandro Mattioli and Walter Mayr, “Following the Money, On the Trail of African Migrant 
Smugglers”, Spiegel Online – International (26 September 2016); Heisterkamp, “Tortured for ransom: extortion on migrant routes”; Judith 
Sunderland, “Why Cooperating with Libya On Migration Could Damage the EU’s Standing”, Human Right Watch (7 November 2016); Peter 
Seeberg, “The EU-Turkey March 2016 Agreement As a Model: New Refugee Regimes and Practices in the Arab Mediterranean and the 
Case of Libya”, Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, Odense (December 2016); Optimity Advisors, the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), A study on smuggling of migrants. 
Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries, Case Study 2, Ethiopia–Libya–Malta-Italy, Study commissioned by the 
European Commission’s DG Migration and Home Affairs (September 2015). 
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methods of the Italian judiciary. When academic articles refer to the subject, the authors only 
shortly describe the Italian practises in combating migrant smuggling without going much 
into detail, or they only refer to the results obtained by the Italian investigations, such as the 
number of arrests carried out.11 However, despite the scarcity of academic research on the 
topic, EU institutions and national prosecution offices are to some extent familiar with the 
Italian investigation methods. Italian prosecutors have shared their methods with European 
and national authorities at different occasions.12 But more can be done to bring the 
prosecutors’ successes and difficulties under the attention and further investigation is needed. 
As to the cooperation between Italian authorities and Operation Triton and Operation Sophia, 
and about the contributions of the missions to the Italian anti-smuggling investigations, 
academic research on these topics is also very limited. Extensive research has been conducted 
especially on Operation Sophia, but the research is focussed on a few topics such as the 
effectiveness of the Operation in disrupting migrant smuggling networks and the judicial 
framework of the Operation.13 
 
Despite the limited attention in academic research, documentation about the Italian 
investigations on migrant smuggling is very extensive. Italian courts do not have a duty to 
disclose material or evidence to the public, but information about court cases and about the 
methods used is acquired through media articles that covered the cases, though court 
documents that were leaked to the press, through parliamentary documents and through a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Optimity Advisors, ICMPD and ECRE, A study on smuggling of migrants. Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third 
countries; Optimity Advisors, ICMPD and ECRE, A study on smuggling of migrants. Case Study 2, Ethiopia–Libya–Malta-Italy; Sahan 
Foundation and IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean 
Route; European Migration Network (EMN), Ad-Hoc Query on Facilitation of irregular immigration (migrants smuggling) to the EU: 
national institutional frameworks, policies and other knowledge-based evidence (17
 
November 2014); Aziz, Monzini, Pastore, The Changing 
Dynamics of Cross-border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean; European Migration Network, Ad-Hoc Query on 
Facilitation of irregular immigration (migrants smuggling) to the EU. 
12 To give an example, they have given presentations on the topic at meetings of the Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and 
Directors of Public Prosecutors of EU Member States: Giovanni Salvi, “From Refoulement to Mare Nostrum. The fight against the 
smuggling of migrants by sea: legal problems and practical solutions” (12 December 2014) & Giovanni Salvi, “New challenges for 
prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED. The experiences of an Italian prosecution office” (3 June 
2016). A presentation held at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg was delivered by Calogero Ferrara: Calogero Ferrara, “Tackling the 
smugglers of migrants. A new approach: the "Glauco" cases” (3 December 2015). Presentations held at the UN level are delivered by Simona 
Ragazzi, Calogero Ferrara, Captain Pierini and Gabriele Fragalà at the Trans-regional Training Workshop on Preventing and Combating the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Sea affecting the Mediterranean Region, held by UNODC and ISISC (Syracuse, Italy, 14-16 October 2015). See 
also: 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Background paper for Committee II, workshop II: Trafficking in persons 
and smuggling of migrants: successes and challenges in criminalization, in mutual legal assistance and in effective protection of witnesses 
and trafficking victims (Doha, 12-19 April 2015); Simona Ragazzi, “The Italian experience. Challenges and interpretative solutions”, 
Presentation held at the UN Working Group on the Smuggling of Migrants, third session (Vienna, 18-20 November 2015) and Simona 
Ragazzi, “New experiences in investigating and prosecuting the migrants’ smuggling: from the national dimension to a European approach”, 
Europe’s crisis: What future for immigration and asylum law and policy?, Seminar of the Migration and Law Network, Queen Mary 
University of London (27-28 June 2016). 
13 Ventrella, “The impact of Operation Sophia on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against migrant smugglers and human traffickers”; 
Steven Blockmans, “New thrust for the CSDP from the refugee and migrant crisis”, CEPS Special Report No. 142 (July 2016); Graham 
Butler and Martin Ratcovich, “Operation Sophia in Uncharted Waters: European and International Law Challenges for the EU Naval 
Mission in the Mediterranean Sea”, Nordic Journal of International Law 85 (2016) 235-259; Marco Gestri, “EUNAVFOR MED: Fighting 
migrant smuggling under UN Security Council Resolution 2240 (2015)”, The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 25 1 (2016) 19-
54; Meijers Committee, Military action against human smugglers: legal questions concerning the EUNAVFOR Med operation (23 
September 2015). 
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limited number of academic articles.14 Commissions of the Italian Parliament regularly call 
upon prosecutors and other stakeholders involved in the smuggling investigations to inform 
them in so-called audizioni about the latest developments, which are made available to the 
public and provide a lot of relevant information. The prosecutors themselves have also written 
articles and given presentations about their investigations, which are openly accessible.15 
These sources are all very useful to collect information about the investigation methods used 
and also to gather information about the cooperation with Operation Triton and Operation 
Sophia. As to this topic, journalistic articles and conducted interviews were other important 
sources. Interviews were conducted with a spokesperson of Frontex, and with the 
commanding officers of two vessels under Operation Sophia and of one vessel under 
Operation Triton. The decision to interview specifically these persons had to do with their 
willingness to provide an interview and was not a deliberate choice. Since only a few 
commanding officers provided information about activities done on board, these experiences 
are not to be considered representative for each vessel operating under Operation Triton or 
Sophia. However, they give important information, are used as examples in the thesis and the 
examples are often backed up by other sources. 
 
The subject shall be approached from two different angles: from the perspective of a 
qualitative analysis and from a case study perspective. The first chapter provides a general 
overview of the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling. In this part, the different 
investigation methods and instruments used will be mentioned. Such an overview makes it 
possible to identify good practises that the EU can try to implement in other EU member 
states. The second and third chapter focus on the cooperation between the Italian authorities 
and the EU Operations Triton and Sophia. In the second chapter, it will be clarified how the 
cooperation currently takes place and which factors complicate an effective cooperation with 
the Italian authorities. Upon that basis, in the third chapter an analysis can be made of how to 
improve Operation Triton and Operation Sophia’s support to the Italian investigations. The 
concluding fourth chapter provides a number of recommendations for the EU. In this final 
chapter, some recommendations are also provided for a third way for the EU to improve the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Academic articles on the subject: Aziz, Monzini, Pastore, The Changing Dynamics of Cross-border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in 
the Mediterranean; European Migration Network, Ad-Hoc Query on Facilitation of irregular immigration (migrants smuggling) to the EU: 
national institutional frameworks, policies and other knowledge-based evidence (17
 
November 2014); Optimity Advisors, ICMPD and 
ECRE, A study on smuggling of migrants. Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries. 
15 See footnote 12. See also: David Mancini, “Successful prosecution of human trafficking – challenges and good practices”, National 
Criminal Justice Responses to Combating Human Trafficking - Challenges and Best Practices, Conference of OSCE, Helsinki (10-11 
September 2008); Roberta Barberini, “La rilevanza penale del fenomeno migratorio”, Questione Giustizia (30 October 2015); Franco 
Roberti, “Il ruolo della Direzione Nazionale Antimafia”, L'immigrazione che verrà, National Seminar in Catania (20-21 February 2015); 
Simona Ragazzi, “Introduzione alla Sessione: Il viaggio in mare”, L'immigrazione che verrà, National Seminar in Catania (20-21 February 
2015). 
 9	  
prosecution of migrant smugglers: by taking over part of the investigations instead of only 
supporting EU member states. That would provide a long-term solution to the combat of the 
smuggling networks and is therefore important to include in this study. 
 
Before focussing on Italy’s investigation methods, some ultimate remarks have to be made. 
Firstly, this study does not intend to assess the efficacy of enforced prosecution methods as a 
means to combat irregular migration. That can hardly be assumed. Stepping up efforts to 
bring migrant smugglers to trial is part of Europe’s comprehensive approach to the refugee 
crisis, but the effects of this instrument will be minor. Even if the number of arrests will rise, 
this will not stop the migration flows. These flows are mainly the result of endless wars, 
security vacuums, poverty and a lack of employment. As long as these root causes are not 
dealt with, migrants will continue trying to reach Europe. Next to that, the smuggling business 
has grown in such proportions, providing an income to tens of thousands of people, that the 
prosecution of a few top smugglers can impossibly eradicate the business. Nevertheless, the 
prosecution of migrant smugglers remains an important task, if only for the sake of justice: by 
punishing those who are most responsible for the wrongdoings.  
 
A second aspect to mention regards the perspective of this thesis. In this study is chosen for a 
law enforcement perspective: current practises will be examined on how they combat the 
migrant smuggling networks and options will be looked at that might improve the fight 
against these smuggling networks. However, the refugee crisis is often approached from a 
human rights perspective. From that perspective, it is more important how migrants are 
treated and in which ways their human rights can be best safeguarded. These two perspectives 
are not always compatible and practises that might be very advantageous for the prosecution 
of migrant smugglers can pose difficulties for the safeguard of human rights. Since this study 
is primarily focussed on the prosecution of migrant smugglers, less attention can be given to 
the human rights point of view. 
 
Finally, it must be mentioned that the choice of Italy as a case study and as an example from 
which important lessons can be learned, does of course not signify that Italy’s fight against 
migrant smuggling is the perfect example to follow in any possible way. Italy is also criticised 
for inhuman treatment towards migrants, for example by collectively expelling a group of 
Sudanese refugees – after a Memorandum of Understanding signed between Italy and Sudan 
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– without looking at their asylum requests16, and by using considerable coercive methods 
against migrants, such as beatings, electric shocks and sexual humiliation, to obtain their 
fingerprints during the registration process.17 Next to that, when it specifically concerns the 
investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers, not every method used by the Italians is 
praiseworthy. Accusations have been made against the treatment of migrant witnesses, in 
which case migrants attending to testify against a smuggler were left carelessly in reception 
centres instead of being placed under protection in safe places.18 These are methods that are 
clearly not to be recommended. But as a country that is very active in the prosecution of 
migrant smugglers, it is by far the best country to study for finding out how to improve the 
EU’s fight against migrant smuggling. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Pietro Barabino, “Migranti, prima espulsione di gruppo: 48 presi a Ventimiglia e rispediti in Sudan. ‘Ma Khartoum viola diritti umani’”, Il 
Fatto Quotidiano (24 August 2016); ASGI, Memorandum d’Intesa tra il Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza Italiano e la Polizia 
Nazionale Sudanese. Guida alla lettura (3 October 2016); Memorandum d'intesa tra il dipartimento della pubblica sicurezza del ministero 
dell'interno italiano e la polizia nazionale del ministero dell'interno sudanese per la lotta alla criminalità, gestione delle frontiere e dei flussi 
migratori ed in materia di rimpatrio. 
17 “Hotspot Italy: How EU’s flagship approach leads to violations of refugee and migrant rights”, Amnesty International (3 november 2016). 
18 Simona Arena, “Messina, visita in centro accoglienza Bisconte «Testimoni contro scafisti lasciati senza tutele»”, Meridionews (8 March 
2016); “I non-luoghi della prima accoglienza a Messina. Settimo report multimediale della campagna Overthefortress”, Melting Pot Europa 
(21 November 2016). 
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1. Italy’s investigation methods in the fight against migrant smuggling  
 
Since the autumn of 2013, the fight against the criminal organisations that are behind the 
migrant smuggling business is a battle fought primarily by Italy. Italian prosecution offices 
introduced new approaches, innovative legal provisions and the use of special methods, which 
will be the focus of this chapter. An introducing paragraph looks closer at the historical 
background and achieved results of the Italian investigations, in terms of investigations 
conducted and information gained about the smugglers’ modus operandi. The subsequent 
paragraphs consider the different aspects of the Italian anti-smuggling investigations, starting 
with the targets of the investigations, followed by the requisites to begin a criminal 
investigation and the methods used during the process of evidence gathering and finishing 
with the difficulties encountered during the investigations. 
 
Historical background of anti-smuggling investigations and smuggling practises 
When migration flows from Libya towards Italy increased enormously after the collapse of 
the Ghaddafi regime in 2011 and especially when a tragic shipwreck off the coast of 
Lampedusa led to the death of 366 people in October 2013, Italian authorities decided to put 
much more effort in the identification and dismantlement of the smuggling organisations 
operating on the route from Libya. Previously, prosecution offices in Apulia conducted anti-
smuggling investigations already since the early 1990s, but these were focussed on the 
migration route between the Balkan countries and the eastern coast of Italy. At the end of 
2013, the attention shifted southwards: Italy started operation Mare Nostrum with the specific 
objective of saving lives at the Mediterranean Sea and investigations on migrant smuggling 
were increasingly performed by the prosecution offices of Palermo and Catania, who focussed 
their attention on the routes between the Horn of Africa and Europe. Since then, impressive 
investigations were launched, among which the Glauco I, II and III investigations (Palermo’s 
prosecution office) and operation Tohkla (Catania’s prosecution office) are the most 
important ones to mention. 
 
Based on these and other investigations, the Italian prosecutors uncovered the main 
smuggling routes and the organisations arranging the migrants’ journeys. They affirm 
knowing almost everything about it. According to them, highly organised criminal groups 
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control at least part of the smuggling business.19 These groups take care of the entire journey 
of a migrant starting from their countries of origin, often in the Horn of Africa, until their 
final destination in North-Europe or North-America. The networks are hierarchically 
structured and include a large range of cross-border contacts. At the African mainland, 
mediators put migrants in touch with the criminal network and make them pay, whereas 
drivers transport the migrants from one country to another. Once arrived in Libya, other 
intermediaries organise the boat journeys and guards keep the migrants imprisoned in flats, 
houses and farms until they are permitted to leave. In South-Italy, low-level middlemen are 
found both outside and inside of reception centres, where they pretend to be relatives in order 
to recruit migrants for their onward journey, and in Milan and Rome major cells are 
uncovered that take charge of the continuation of the migrant’s journeys to North-Europe. At 
the top of these comprehensive criminal networks are the high-level bosses, who gain most 
financial benefits.20 
 
Approaching migrant smuggling with anti-mafia methods and pursuing the top leaders  
Two crucial approaches lie at the heart of the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling, 
which enabled them to conduct a large number of arrests and to gain so much information 
about the smuggling networks. Firstly, the Italian authorities consider migrant smuggling a 
highly organised crime, view the smuggling networks as criminal organisations equal to the 
mafia and apply anti-mafia methods to migrant smuggling cases, which is a very innovative 
approach. In Italy, district prosecution offices are in charge of investigations and prosecutions 
and these offices are subdivided in two distinct offices, which are the anti-mafia prosecution 
office (DDA - Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia) and an ordinary prosecution office (Procura 
Ordinaria). When serious organised crimes are committed, the anti-mafia district offices take 
charge of the investigations. The Italian authorities decided to place migrant smuggling 
investigations also under the responsibility of these anti-mafia offices. Within the anti-mafia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 According to current research, both loosely connected small groups of persons, who focus only on the crossing of one border or on a part 
of the journey (the so-called “cross-border cottage industries”), and very large and transnationally operating criminal networks, who take 
control of the organisation of entire migration routes, are active along the main migration routes. Therefore, it cannot be said that the highly 
organised criminal groups, as uncovered in the Italian investigations, are representative of all smuggling coming from Libya and the Horn of 
Africa. See: European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Working document on tackling criminal 
smuggling, trafficking and labour exploitation of irregular migrants (19 October 2015); Michael Collyer, “Cross-border cottage industries 
and fragmented migration”, in: Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guidl (eds.), Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings: 
Policy dilemmas in the EU (Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 2016). 
20 Information about the smuggling business and the criminal organisations behind it is found in many sources, among which court 
documents of prosecution offices and presentations given by prosecutors. The information given above is based on: Carlo Amenta, Rino 
Coluccello, Paolo Di Betta, Gery Ferrara, “Il traffico di essere umani e i network del contrabbando tra Libia e Italia”, in: Francesco Semprini 
(ed.), Emergenza Libia (Soveria Mannelli 2016); Ragazzi, “New experiences in investigating and prosecuting the migrants’ smuggling: from 
the national dimension to a European approach”; Eric Reidy, Ghost Boat, A boat went missing with 243 people on board. What happened to 
them? We decided to find out in a 10-part, open, crowdsourced investigation; Procura distrettuale della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di 
Catania, Richiesta di applicazione di misura cautelare personale, request for the preliminary hearing judge (Giudice per le indagini 
preliminari) (5 December 2014). 
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district offices of Palermo and Catania, specialised teams were set up to focus solely on this 
crime and the methods allowed in anti-mafia investigations were equally applied to anti-
smuggling cases: extensive wiretapping, witness-protection programs for informants, 
interviews with them for the collection of information and interviews with prison inmates, 
among which Italian Mafiosi.21 Nuredin Atta Wehabrebi was the first smuggling kingpin who 
turned into an informant after his arrest and decided to cooperate with the Italian authorities. 
Now he is part of the same witness protection programmes that mafia informants benefit 
from.22 
 
An anti-mafia approach of this kind has resulted in a second important asset of Italy’s 
smuggling investigations: the search for the leading members of the criminal groups. Whether 
it concerns migrant smuggling, mafia or drugs, law enforcement and judicial authorities 
always have to decide whether to build cases on easy-to-catch and low-level crew members or 
to let them go – or perhaps use their information – and to focus their efforts on the higher 
pawns in the organisational chain, who are more difficult to bring to trial but whose arrests 
certainly have a higher impact. With regard to the smuggling activities along the Central 
Mediterranean Route, Italy decided to prioritise the prosecution of the higher levelled 
smugglers and the top kingpins, just as it is common in anti-mafia and drugs investigations.23 
“We are not interested in the scafisti, but first and foremost in the mobsters at the very top of 
the chain”, as a former prosecutor in the office of Palermo stated.24 At the lowest level of the 
chain are the drivers of the boats coming from Libya to Italy, the so-called scafisti. Although 
officially facilitating irregular migration and therefore being liable to a penalty, these scafisti 
are often migrants themselves, who do not belong to the criminal networks and receive a 
discount on their travel by providing the service, and who are easily replaceable.25 On a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ferrara, “Tackling the smugglers of migrants. A new approach: the "Glauco" cases”; Salvi, “From Refoulement to Mare Nostrum. The 
fight against the smuggling of migrants by sea: legal problems and practical solutions”; Amenta, Coluccello, Di Betta and Ferrara, “Il traffico 
di essere umani e i network del contrabbando tra Libia e Italia”; Hester van Bruggen, Marjolein Cupido and Joop Voetelink, “Militair-
justitiële samenwerking bij de aanpak van migratiestromen”, Nederlands Juristenblad 36 (21 October 2016). 
22 Hannah Roberts, “People smuggling kingpin wracked by guilt over drownings turns supergrass: Trafficker reveals the brutality, boasts and 
booming business behind the sick trade in humans”, Mail online (1 September 2015); Bühler, Koelbl, Maoli and Mayr, “Following the 
Money, On the Trail of African Migrant Smugglers”. 
23 Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED. The experiences of an Italian 
prosecution office” (3 June 2016); Salvi, “From Refoulement to Mare Nostrum. The fight against the smuggling of migrants by sea: legal 
problems and practical solutions”; Luisa Santangelo, “Migranti, svolta nella lotta al traffico di uomini. Richiesta l'estradizione del superboss 
egiziano”, Meridionews (7 March 2016); van Bruggen, Cupido and Voetelink, “Militair-justitiële samenwerking bij de aanpak van 
migratiestromen”. 
24Annalisa Camilli, “Non basta condannare gli scafisti per fermare la strage di migranti nel Mediterraneo”, Internazionale (16 December 
2016); Italian Parliament, Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno delle mafie e sulle altre associazioni criminali, anche 
straniere (Bicameral Antimafia Commission), Audizione del procuratore della Repubblica presso il tribunale di Catania, Giovanni Salvi (7 
July 2015). 
25 Fabrizio Gatti, “Io, scafista della morte”, L’Espresso (16 October 2013); Giovanni Tizian, “Buba e i ragazzini «scafisti per necessità»”, 
L’Espresso (19 April 2016). 
 14	  
yearly basis, hundreds of boat drivers are still arrested and prosecuted in Italy, but they are not 
the main priority of the prosecution offices.26 
 
Starting a case: criminalising migrant smuggling and asserting national jurisdiction 
The prosecutors of Palermo and Catania approached their migrant smuggling investigations in 
these two ways. But they could not even start an investigation without two requisites: the 
penalisation of the offence in criminal law and the assertion of national jurisdiction. As to the 
first aspect, the Italian criminal code penalises the facilitation of irregular migration. That is 
not an innovative legal provision of the Italian authorities, since many other EU member 
states have penalised the crime as well and the current legal framework on migrant smuggling 
of the EU, codified in the Facilitation Framework Decision and Directive of 2002, also 
includes it.27 However, in the Italian criminal code, the smugglers are exposed to harder 
punishments when aggravating circumstances are present – such as endangering the migrants’ 
lives, exposing them to inhuman treatments and engaging in smuggling activities for financial 
gain or other benefits –, and an exception is made to those facilitators that provide 
humanitarian assistance to migrants.28 In these aspects, it goes further than the European legal 
framework.29 
 
A second requirement for starting a case regards the assertion of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
relates to the power or the right of a political agency to prescribe and enforce its law. If 
jurisdiction is asserted, a state has the authority to bring a person to trial. Traditionally, 
jurisdiction was limited to a state’s territory, meaning that a state asserts national jurisdiction 
only within its territorial boundaries. It implies that a state is authorised to try a person who is 
a national of the state and to try a foreigner of a crime that has been conducted within the 
territory of the state.30 This principle proved to be a problem for apprehending and 
prosecuting smugglers whose activities took place on the high seas. The assertion of 
jurisdiction on the high seas is governed by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 van Bruggen, Cupido and Voetelink, “Militair-justitiële samenwerking bij de aanpak van migratiestromen” 
27 Council of the European Union, Council Directive  of 28 November 2002 (2002/90/EC) defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence; Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 (2002/946/JHA) on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. 
28 The facilitation of irregular migration is criminalised in article 12 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998 (Testo unico delle disposizioni 
concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero, also referred to as Immigration Law or the National 
Law on Migration). It defines the crime of abetting illegal immigration, in other words promoting, directing, organising, financing or 
operating the transport of foreigners into the State, or performing other acts intended to procure illegal entry into the territory of the State. 
29 In the European provisions, the facilitation of irregular migration is still a criminal offence but the aspect of financial gain is absent, the 
obligation to provide an exception for humanitarian assistance to migrants is left out as well, and EU member states have to decide for 
themselves which sanctions are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 
28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. 
30 James C. Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence”, Law & Economics 
Working Papers 106 (2014). 
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(UNCLOS), providing that no state can assert national jurisdiction on the high seas, save for 
exceptional cases.31 For the prosecution of smugglers committing crimes on the high seas, a 
link to the Italian territory had to be established. For their apprehension on the high seas, 
Italian flagged ships needed to be authorised with the enforcement powers to board, inspect 
and seize the vessels used to smuggle migrants and to arrest suspected smugglers on board.32 
 
The Italian authorities established this link on the basis of international law and the modus 
operandi of the smugglers. Although the smuggler’s techniques for organising the boat trips 
change over time, over the last years it was common to rely on the intervention of Italian 
rescue forces. Migrants were put into small boats, that were unsafe and placed the migrants at 
extreme risks, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) – who coordinates the 
search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean Sea – was called to save them. It was a 
strategy chosen by the smugglers to reduce costs and to escape prosecution. However, as 
codified by UNCLOS, naval units have the moral and legal obligation of saving human lives 
in distress at sea and they are bound to the principle of non-refoulement, a principle of 
customary international law which forbids a country receiving migrants to return them to a 
country where they are in danger of prosecution.33 For these reasons, Italian naval units were 
practically forced to complete the illegal journey towards Italy and partake in the criminal 
offence. They themselves were not punishable on the basis of the principle of duress/necessity 
– the navy was compelled to save the migrants’ lives –, but this technique provided the Italian 
authorities with the missing link for asserting national jurisdiction on the high seas.34 
 
As to the necessary enforcement powers to apprehend smugglers at sea, Italy’s prosecution 
offices authorised themselves with these powers by combining the legal basis of two 
international conventions: UNCLOS and the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since this provision of UNCLOS will come back several times in the 
thesis, it is useful to name these exceptional cases. They are mentioned in article 110: “Except where acts of interference derive from powers 
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in 
accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged 
in piracy; (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; (c) the ship is engaged in unauthorised broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has 
jurisdiction under article 109; (d) the ship is without nationality; or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.” 
32 Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED”; Ragazzi, “The Italian 
experience. Challenges and interpretative solutions”; Ragazzi, “New experiences in investigating and prosecuting the migrants’ smuggling: 
from the national dimension to a European approach”; Salvi, “From Refoulement to Mare Nostrum. The fight against the smuggling of 
migrants by sea: legal problems and practical solutions”; Gestri, “EUNAVFOR MED: Fighting migrant smuggling under UN Security 
Council Resolution 2240 (2015)”. 
33 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), article 98, duty to render assistance. 
34 Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED”; Ragazzi, “The Italian 
experience. Challenges and interpretative solutions”; Ragazzi, “New experiences in investigating and prosecuting the migrants’ smuggling: 
from the national dimension to a European approach”; Salvi, “From Refoulement to Mare Nostrum. The fight against the smuggling of 
migrants by sea: legal problems and practical solutions”. 
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which is an important part of international law setting up provisions for migrant smuggling.35 
UNCLOS grants the right to visit stateless vessels on the high seas – the boats overloaded 
with migrants are often stateless – and the UN Protocol permits states to “take appropriate 
measures” in case a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants and confirming evidence 
is found.36 According to the Italian authorities, appropriate measures can consist in the seizure 
of the smugglers’ boat and the arrest of the smugglers. This affirmation received confirmation 
at Italy’s highest court of appeal in 2014. A year later, a European Council Decision and a 
Resolution adopted by the UN Security Council further strengthened the legal basis: by 
allowing to inspect, board and search vessels suspected of smuggling migrants and to use 
“appropriate measures against the vessels, persons and cargo” (EU Council Decision) or “all 
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” (UN Resolution).37 
 
Methods and instruments used to gather evidence for trial 
These legal provisions open up possibilities to start an investigation, but after that the entire 
process of gathering evidence and bringing a suspect to trial have yet to take place, not to 
mention the importance of resources to carry out the investigations. As regards evidence, the 
migrant smuggling investigations are conducted with anti-mafia techniques, and among these 
techniques prosecutors have acquired most information through wiretapping and migrant 
testimonies. Both sources have proved to be very important in identifying the leaders of the 
smuggling organisations. In order for the migrant testimonies to be used as evidence before 
court, some legal obstacles had yet to be overcome. Firstly, in order for migrant testimonies to 
be considered evidence, migrants had to be treated as witnesses instead of defendants. But 
since illegal entry is a minor offence in Italian law and therefore punishable, officially 
migrants had to be prosecuted as defendants. Prosecutors based in Catania found the means to 
treat migrants as witnesses nonetheless: since no attempt to commit a minor offence can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime (2000)”. The Protocol was adopted in 2000 as a supplement of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime and contains provisions to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, to protect the rights of smuggled migrants and to 
promote cooperation between states, provisions to which the signed states have to adhere. 
36 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 110: “A warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship is not justified 
in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (d) the ship is without nationality”; UN Protocol against Smuggling of 
Migrants (article 8, paragraph 7): “A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants 
by sea and is without nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may board and search the vessel. If evidence 
confirming the suspicion is found, that State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant domestic and international 
law.” 
37 UN Security Council Resolution adopted by the UN Security Council of 9 October 2015: Member states are authorised “to inspect 
unflagged vessels suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking on the High Seas off the coast of Libya, to seize them 
after confirmation of smuggling and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances”; Council of the European Union, 
Council Decision on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) (2015/778) (18 May 
2015): “On the high seas, in accordance with relevant domestic and international law, States may interdict vessels suspected of smuggling 
migrants, where there is flag State authorisation to board and search the vessel or where the vessel is without nationality, and may take 
appropriate measures against the vessels, persons and cargo.” 
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punished, migrants rescued at sea are not liable and consequently they can be heard at court as 
witnesses.38 The interpretation was confirmed by Italy’s highest court of appeal. Secondly, 
problems arose regarding the way evidence of testimonies should be collected and presented 
at court. Migrants had to be interviewed and these interviews had to be cross-examined before 
the judge at trial. However, migrants very often escaped from reception centres or 
disappeared shortly after their arrival. In order to solve that problem, migrants were 
interviewed immediately after their arrival at the port and their cross-examination took place 
during the preliminary investigations before the trial. Such an anticipation of legal evidence 
(incidente probatorio) was - under very exceptional circumstances - allowed in the Italian 
code of criminal procedure. In case migrants had already disappeared before the cross-
examination, the testimonies could still be used as so-called “sole or decisive evidence” on 
the basis of the European Convention of Human Rights.39 
 
Difficulties and problems encountered 
The new methods and the large quantity of resources put into the investigations have resulted 
in many successes. However, the prosecution offices dealing with migrant smuggling have 
encountered difficulties and obstacles as well. A major problem facing the prosecutors 
regards the lack of cooperation with third countries.40 Italian prosecutors have unravelled the 
entire hierarchy of several criminal organisations, claim to possess the names, telephone 
numbers and residence of the highest pawns in the organisations and have gathered the 
evidence to put them to trial, but the big mobsters stay safely abroad in Africa. Extraditions 
and other legal requests for collecting evidence are refused, as the Egyptian authorities did in 
the case of three smuggling top leaders: in the Tohkla investigations, the smuggling leaders 
were accused of being responsible for several shipwrecks but unfortunately the Egyptian 
criminal code does not criminalise migrant smuggling – it is merely a contraventional offence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED”; Camilli, “Non basta 
condannare gli scafisti per fermare la strage di migranti nel Mediterraneo”; Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo (DNA), 
Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal Procuratore nazionale e dalla Direzione nazionale antimafia e antiterrorismo nel periodo 1 luglio 
2014 – 30 giugno 2015 (February 2016). 
39 Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED”; Ragazzi, “The Italian 
experience. Challenges and interpretative solutions”; Italian Parliament, Comitato parlamentare di controllo sull’attuazione dell’accordo di 
schengen, di vigilanza sull’attività di europol, di controllo e vigilanza in materia di immigrazione, Indagine conoscitiva sui flussi migratori in 
Europa attraverso l’Italia, nella prospettiva della riforma del sistema europeo comune d’asilo e della revisione dei modelli di accoglienza  
(16 December 2015). 
40 The lack of cooperation with third countries is very often mentioned by Italian prosecutors. See for example: DNA, Relazione annuale 1 
luglio 2014 – 30 giugno 2015 (February 2016); European Migration Network, Ad-Hoc Query on Facilitation of irregular immigration 
(migrants smuggling) to the EU; Optimity Advisors, ICMPD and ECRE, A study on smuggling of migrants. Case Study 2, Ethiopia–Libya–
Malta-Italy; Eurojust, Tactical meeting on judicial challenges in illegal immigrant smuggling - Outcome Report (Brussels 9456/16) (25 May 
2016); Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED”. 
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– and the arrests are still pending.41 Besides these obstacles regarding extradition procedures 
in particular, general problems in the cooperation with countries of origin and transit in Africa 
are a recurrent phenomenon. Cooperation is often obstructed by corrupt civil servants who 
take part in the smuggling business themselves or are easily bribed. In other cases, the major 
criminal kingpins enjoy considerable protection from their governments.42 In the case of 
Libya, a national authority to cooperate with is completely absent and the different militias 
and rivalling governments within the Libyan state make judicial and police cooperation 
simply impossible.43 
 
Conclusion 
In the fight against migrant smuggling, a continuous interplay takes place between the 
migrant smugglers, who meticulously follow the Italian and European policies in the 
Mediterranean Sea and modify their modus operandi accordingly, and the prosecution offices, 
who puzzle out the smugglers’ operating ways, who change their working methods in line 
with the new Italian and European policies and who adapt themselves to the smugglers’ new 
approaches in terms of the instruments used as well as in matters of legislation and 
jurisdiction. As this overview of Italy’s investigations shows, the Italian prosecution offices 
have made a lot of efforts to identify the smuggling networks and used innovative methods 
for that purpose. With the creation of specialised teams, with a focus on the kingpins of the 
smuggling business as a starting point, with innovative anti-mafia methods that include 
wiretapping, migrant testimonies and interviews with informants, with the necessary legal 
provisions to facilitate the gathering of evidence to apprehend smugglers on the high seas, and 
with effective international cooperation, they demonstrate that anti-smuggling cases can be 
brought to a success: they can put a blow to the criminal organisations and compel them to 
change their modus operandi.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Extradition requests by Italy have often been denied for two reasons: the double criminalisation clause and the prohibition of extradition on 
nationals. See Italian Parliament, Audizione del procuratore della Repubblica presso il tribunale di Catania, Giovanni Salvi (7 July 2015); 
Eurojust, Tactical meeting on judicial challenges in illegal immigrant smuggling - Outcome Report. 
42 “Tranello agli italiani: per arrestare il falso trafficante eritreo pagato del denaro”, Africa ExPress (12 January 2017); Colin Freeman, 
“Europe hunts for people-trafficking gangs behind tide of migrant misery”, The Telegraph (18 April 2015); Kingsley, “Libya's people 
smugglers: military action won't stop this multifaceted trade”; Salvi, “New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare 
Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED”; Optimity Advisors, ICMPD and ECRE, A study on smuggling of migrants. Case Study 2, Ethiopia–Libya–
Malta-Italy. 
43 Lorenzo Galeazzi and Mario Portanova, “Traffico di migranti, così Egitto e Libia salvano i boss delle stragi. L’Isis ringrazia”, Il Fatto 
Quotidiano (4 dicember 2015); Camilli, “Non basta condannare gli scafisti per fermare la strage di migranti nel Mediterraneo”. 
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2. The cooperation between EU naval missions and Italian judicial authorities 
 
This chapter will focus on two European naval missions, Operation Triton and EUNAVFOR 
Med, and on their contributions to the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling. In order to 
ascertain to what extent these contributions can be improved, it has to be identified what an 
ideal cooperation between the Italian authorities and naval missions looks like and which 
problems currently obstruct an ideal cooperation. These two aspects return in the structure of 
the chapter. As an introductory paragraph, a small overview and historical background is 
provided of naval missions in the Mediterranean Sea. Subsequently, it will be examined what 
an ideal cooperation between naval assets and the Italian judiciary consists of. In this part, the 
point of view of the Italian prosecutors will be taken, as they perform the anti-smuggling 
investigations and know how naval missions can best support these investigations. After that, 
attention will be given to the current cooperation between the Italian authorities and the EU 
naval missions. By examining the regulations and institutional set-up of the missions, by 
looking at experiences from vessels having participated in the operations and by including 
experiences from the cooperation between the Italian autorities and Italian naval assets, 
current shortcomings and the reasons of these shortcomings will become clear. Upon that 
basis, recommendations can be made for a better functioning of the EU naval missions, which 
will be the subject of the third chapter. 
 
Naval missions in South-Europe: Operation Mare Nostrum, Triton, Sophia and Mare Sicuro 
Naval missions in the Mediterranean Sea have been conducted since the second half of 2013. 
As a response to increased migratory flows towards Italy and in the absence of a joint effort 
under the EU, the Italian government started up Operation Mare Nostrum in October 2013. 
The mission was primarily focussed on search and rescue operations and lasted a year, in the 
course of which more than 150 000 people were rescued at sea and 366 presumed migrant 
smugglers were turned over to the Italian judicial authorities. In April 2015, half a year after 
the ending of Operation Mare Nostrum, Italy launched another naval mission, Operation Mare 
Sicuro. It was a military mission, not specifically focussed on search and rescue but centred 
on national security and the protection of ships and oil platforms. 
 
It was after the ending of Operation Mare Nostrum, after continuous pressure from Italy for a 
joint European rescue mission and after a series of shipwrecks, that European leaders decided 
 20	  
to start two maritime missions in the Mediterranean Sea. Operation Triton started in 
November 2014 as a replacement of Mare Nostrum and was reinforced in April 2015. It is a 
civilian joint operation coordinated by EU border security agency Frontex and mandated to 
ensure the surveillance of Italy’s external borders. The assets are deployed by different EU 
member states.44 The European Council decided to launch a Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) mission, called EUNAVFOR Med or Operation Sophia, in April 2015 as well. 
As stated in the Council Decision, the mission should prevent more people from dying at sea 
by contributing to “the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking 
networks”.45 Similarly to Operation Triton, Operation Sophia relies on the assets that are 
provided by the EU member states. The mission is currently operational in Italy’s territorial 
waters and on the high seas, but it could expand its activities into the territorial waters and 
into the territory of Libya, for which Libya’s consent is required. Currently, Operation Triton, 
Sophia and Mare Sicuro are operational in the South Mediterranean and their vessels are 
present in the area alongside commercial vessels and vessels belonging to NGO’s. 
 
 
2.1. The ideal cooperation with naval missions from the viewpoint of Italian prosecutors 
 
The naval missions in the Mediterranean Sea how important similarities that are important for 
the purpose of law enforcement. Whether they are patrolling in the territorial waters of Italy 
or on the high seas and deploying only Italian flagged vessels or assets of different EU 
member states, the naval missions are mandated to intercept migrant vessels and/or obliged to 
conduct search and rescue missions under international law. According to Italian prosecutors, 
the interception and rescue of migrant vessels provides a number of opportunities to start 
criminal investigations on board. As they state, from the very first moment when a migrant 
boat is intercepted or rescued, the process of gathering information and collecting evidence to 
support Italy’s judicial investigations on migrant smuggling can already start. They place 
great emphasis on the first investigative steps that are taken on board and have mentioned a 
number of steps: interviews with migrants, the detection of smugglers or other persons of 
interest (who will be handed over to the Italian authorities immediately after disembarkation), 
the taking of photographs and videos, the confiscation and search of satellite cell phones 
(especially satellite cell phones purposely given to the migrants to call for help can contain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Frontex press release, “Vessels deployed by Frontex help rescue 2 800 people in Central Mediterranean” (7 May 2015). 
45 Council of the European Union, Council Decision on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean 
(EUNAVFOR MED) (2015/778) (18 May 2015). 
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valuable information), the seizure of other objects that are related to the crime and the 
interception of phone calls.46 Some of these steps can even be taken only on board of the ship, 
or otherwise important information will be lost. The cell phones used to make the emergency 
call might have been thrown away in the sea, migrants may have disappeared or not willing 
anymore to provide information, suspect behaviour or criminal activities among the rescued 
migrants may not have been detected, and the interception of phone calls can only take place 
from Italian mainland within limited reach.47 
 
Currently, law enforcement activities on board are considered even more crucial with a view 
to the impasse in which the Italian prosecutors find themselves. Investigative activities aboard 
naval assets in the Mediterranean Sea are often focussed on the detection of smugglers found 
among the migrants rescued – I will come back to this. However, due to Italy’s interventions 
on the high seas and the start of operation Sophia, the risk of arrest on the high seas became 
too high and even the lowest ranked smugglers stay within Libyan territorial waters, making 
the efforts to detect smugglers on board useless. Now, only the so-called occasional scafisti 
can be apprehended but they are just migrants forced to drive the boats. The smugglers’ 
absence in the international waters causes Italian prosecutors to describe their current judicial 
proceedings as a stalemate.48 In order to break the impasse, Italian prosecutors consider law 
enforcement activities aboard vessels more important than ever, especially those aimed at 
gaining information about the higher levelled smugglers and the criminal organisations.49 If 
these activities are neglected or if their correct legal proceedings are not respected and any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Italian Parliament, Indagine conoscitiva sul contributo dei militari italiani al controllo dei flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo e l'impatto 
delle attività delle organizzazioni non governative, Audizione del Capo del III Reparto Operazioni del Comando generale della Guardia di 
finanza, generale di divisione Stefano Screpanti (April 2017); Italian Parliament, Indagine conoscitiva sul contributo dei militari italiani al 
controllo dei flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo e l'impatto delle attività delle organizzazioni non governative, Audizione di Fabrice Leggeri, 
direttore esecutivo di FRONTEX (April 2017); Italian Parliament, Audizione del procuratore della Repubblica presso il tribunale di Catania, 
Giovanni Salvi (7 July 2015); “Polizia ferma 5 scafisti, 3 sono minorenni_ 6 gommoni soccorsi”, Vittoriadaily.net (30 March 2016); Italian 
Parliament, Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul sistema di accoglienza, di identificazione ed espulsione, nonché sulle condizioni di 
trattenimento dei migranti e sulle risorse pubbliche impegnate, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catania, 
Carmelo Zuccaro (9 May 2017); Italian Parliament, Indagine conoscitiva sul contributo dei militari italiani al controllo dei flussi migratori 
nel Mediterraneo e l'impatto delle attività delle organizzazioni non governative, Audizione del Comandante generale del Corpo di 
capitanerie di porto, ammiraglio ispettore (CP) Vincenzo Melone (May 2017). 
47 Italian Parliament, Audizione del generale di divisione Stefano Screpanti (April 2017). 
48Italian Parliament, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (9 May 2017); Salvi, 
“New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED. The experiences of an Italian 
prosecution office”; Italian Parliament, Comitato parlamentare di controllo sull’attuazione dell’accordo di schengen, di vigilanza sull’attività 
di europol, di controllo e vigilanza in materia di immigrazione, Audizione del procuratore della Repubblica presso il tribunale di Catania, 
dottor Carmelo Zuccaro (22 March 2017); Italian Parliament, Indagine conoscitiva sul contributo dei militari italiani al controllo dei flussi 
migratori nel Mediterraneo e l'impatto delle attività delle organizzazioni non governative, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica di 
Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (3 may 2017). 
49 Italian Parliament, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (9 May 2017); Salvi, 
“New challenges for prosecution of migrants trafficking: from Mare Nostrum to EUNAVFOR MED. The experiences of an Italian 
prosecution office”; Italian Parliament, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica di Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (3 may 2017); Ragazzi, 
“The Italian experience. Challenges and interpretative solutions”. 
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evidence found is useless in court, the judicial investigations remain in their current position 
of “checkmate”.50 
 
The effective execution of law enforcement activities aboard is also a requisite for the only 
way left to arrest smugglers on the high seas, as Italian prosecutors argue: smugglers have to 
be forced out of Libya’s territorial waters. In order to achieve that, special police forces need 
to be placed aboard vessels located closely to Libya’s territorial waters. These vessels should 
be equipped with sophisticated instruments to perform satellite interceptions of phone calls, 
and the police forces on board need to be authorised with the executive power to intercept the 
calls. That enables them to detect the smugglers’ activities from the beginning and not only 
after a boat is in danger. Only in that way, and only if not a single vessel performs rescue 
missions within Libya’s internal waters, smugglers that escort the boats filled with migrants 
can be detected in time and the police forces present could immediately apprehend them. 
Apart from the requirements just mentioned, this would however imply a forward movement 
of European or Italian naval missions, whose vessels are currently located much more 
backwards towards the Italian shore, or require the permission of NGO’s active in the area to 
embark police officers – I shall come back to the activities of these NGO’s.51 
 
 
2.2. Law enforcement activities conducted by Operation Triton and Operation Sophia 
 
The interception and rescue of migrant vessels provides a number of opportunities to start 
criminal investigations on board, whether these are focussed on the detection of smugglers 
present among the migrants or on the gathering of information about the organisations behind 
the smuggling industry. However, it remains to be asked to what extent these activities are 
practically done aboard the vessels of Operation Triton and Operation Sophia. 
 
Mandates and law enforcement activities of Operation Triton and Operation Sophia 
A closer look at the official documents of Operation Triton and Operation Sophia shows that 
both missions are mandated to conduct some of the activities mentioned above. As a border 
control and surveillance agency, Operation Triton has the core objective to detect and prevent 
unauthorised border crossing and to tackle cross border crime. The operational plan of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Italian Parliament, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (9 May 2017). 
51 Italian Parliament, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (9 May 2017); Italian 
Parliament, Audizione del Procuratore della Repubblica di Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro (3 may 2017). 
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mission mentions a number of activities, such as intercepting suspicious vessels, taking 
measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally and reporting other illegal 
activities detected to the competent authorities.”52 In order to enhance border security, the 
mission supports the registration and identification of migrants by conducting screening 
activities. Operation Triton is an intelligence driven agency as well. As such, the operational 
activities of the mission are also aimed to gather information on the people-smuggling 
networks and, as the operational plan states, it does so by carrying our debriefing activities.53 
 
Operation Sophia is specifically aimed at the detection and apprehension of migrant 
smugglers and the disposal of the smugglers’ vessels. In order to detect persons suspected of 
smuggling, a spokesperson of the EU military staff stated that “all questioning, forensics and 
evidence gathering is conducted by qualified and authorised personnel through to the arrest 
and start of the judicial prosecution process.”54 Alongside these primary objectives, Operation 
Sophia is also aimed to gather intelligence in order to identify the smuggling networks, their 
operating ways, financing, etc. Enrico Credendino, the Operation Commander of 
EUNAVFOR Med, has referred to debriefing activities conducted on board for this purpose. 
According to him, search and rescue operations were taken advantage of in order to interview 
migrants and gain information about their journeys.55 
 
In practise, both naval missions have indeed contributed to the Italian investigations on 
migrant smuggling. In the first place, it concerns the apprehension of suspected smugglers. 
Until April 2017, Operation Sophia has disposed of 414 migrant vessels and detected 109 
suspected migrant smugglers.56 According to a press release of Frontex, the vessels deployed 
in operation Triton contributed to the arrest of 588 suspected smugglers in 2016.57 These 
results were achieved on the basis of interviews with migrants and observations during the 
interception or rescue operation and on board of the ship.58 As to the gathering of information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Frontex, Operational Plan - Joint Operation EPN Triton 2015 (2015/OPS/05). 
53 Ibidem. 
54 British Parliament, House of Lords, European Union Committee, Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean, an 
impossible challenge (13 May 2016); British Parliament, House of Lords, European Union Committee, Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval 
mission in the Mediterranean, an impossible challenge: examination of witness Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe, 
Director General, European Union Military Staff (3 March 2016). 
55 Italian Parliament, Commissioni congiunte 4a (Difesa) del Senato della Repubblica e IV (Difesa) della Camera dei deputati, Audizione 
dell’ammiraglio di divisione Enrico Credendino, Operation Commander della missione EUNAVFOR MED – Operazione SOPHIA (February 
2016), 
56 Italian Parliament, Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul sistema di accoglienza, di identificazione ed espulsione, nonché sulle 
condizioni di trattenimento dei migranti e sulle risorse pubbliche impegnate, Audizione dell'Ammiraglio di Divisione Enrico Credendino, 
Comandante della missione EUNAVFOR MED (April 2017). 
57 Frontex Press Release, “Vessels deployed by Frontex help rescue 2 800 people in Central Mediterranean” (7 May 2017). 
58 Italian Parliament, Audizione dell'Ammiraglio di Divisione Enrico Credendino, Comandante della missione EUNAVFOR MED (April 
2017). 
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about the smuggling organisations, it seems that many activities are done on board for this 
purpose and that at least part of the collected information arrives at the Italian prosecution’s 
offices. A recent progress report of Operation Sophia states that the picture of the smuggler’s 
business model has been completed for 70% - the gaps are due to a lack of assets and mainly 
concern the smugglers’ activities along the Libyan coastline.59 Operation Sophia also 
contributed to the identification of a network that traffics women and children with a view to 
their sexual exploitation.60 Italian prosecutors receive information from the naval missions 
immediately after the embarkation of a ship. All activities conducted on board, related to law 
enforcement, are filed in a report and handed over to an Italian prosecutor, who is present 
whenever a ship with rescued migrants embarks in one of the designated Italian ports.61 
 
Experiences from participating vessels  
Experiences from participating vessels also show that police tasks are performed on board of 
Triton and Sophia vessels, but the number of police tasks performed is limited and differs 
from vessel to vessel. As the commanding officers of several vessels participating in the 
missions brought forward and as the activities carried out will show, it also seems that the 
focus of the activities lies primarily on the detection of the smugglers who might be present, 
and not on the gathering of information about the criminal organisations and the higher 
levelled smugglers. After each rescue mission, the crew of a Dutch frigate under Operation 
Triton registered the migrants and interviewed them and tried to detect smugglers by 
observation and by taking photographs.62 When too many rescue missions were performed 
and too many migrants were on board, the customs police on board (Koninklijke 
Marechaussee) could not proceed with the interviews and left that to the Italian authorities 
after embarkation. The crew of a Belgian frigate, deployed in Operation Sophia, performed 
the same activities: mere observation, the registration of migrants and the conducting of 
interviews on a voluntary basis.63 On board of the Slovenian vessel Triglav, that joined 
Operation Sophia for several months, the military police did the registration of migrants, took 
photograph and videos of the registration process and handed over confiscated cell phones 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Operation Commander Op SOPHIA (EEAS) Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino, EUNAVFOR MED - Operation SOPHIA Six Monthly 
Report, 1 January – 31 October 2016 (November 2016). 
60 British Parliament, Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean, an impossible challenge: examination of witness 
Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe; Italian Parliament, Audizione del procuratore della Repubblica presso il tribunale di Catania, 
dottor Carmelo Zuccaro (22 March 2017). 
61 Interview with Commanding Officer of Dutch frigate Zr. Ms. Van Amstel; Interview with Commanding Officer of Belgium Frigate 
Leopold I. 
62 Interview with Commanding Officer of Dutch frigate Zr. Ms. Van Amstel. 
63 Interview with Commanding Officer of Belgium Frigate Leopold I; Italian Parliament, Audizione dell’ammiraglio di divisione Enrico 
Credendino (February 2016). 
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and other personal belongings to the Italian authorities, but lacked the capacity to conduct 
interviews.64 
 
The Norwegian vessel Siem Pilot, operating under Operation Triton, went to much greater 
lengths to assist in criminal investigations. The crew of the vessel was augmented by 
Norwegian policeman – amongst whom some intelligence officers –, soldiers, coast guards 
officials and Italian liaison officers from the Guardia di Finanza (Italian customs police) and 
the Italian coast guard, and the commanding officer was also a policemen.65 They consider the 
detection of smugglers among the thousands of refugees to be an important part of their 
mission and conduct a large number of police tasks: they take photographs and video 
recordings during a rescue mission, evaluate mobile phones, investigate corpses in a separate 
forensic department, take pictures, DNA samples and fingerprints of every migrant, and they 
even undress each one and register injuries.66 All the information is forwarded to the Italian 
authorities and to the Norwegian police.67 On the basis of these activities performed on board, 
Siem Pilot collected information about 160 so-called persons of interest (POI’s): persons who 
were suspected of migrant smuggling or who were witnesses and whom the Italian police 
should interview. This information was also passed on to the Italian authorities, and 
sometimes they were even reported about the activities on board prior upon arrival in a port.68 
Next to these police tasks, it should be mentioned – just to give credit– that Siem Pilot is also 
praised for its efforts to rescue migrants: in total, since the start of its deployment in June 
2015 until the end of 2016, Siem Pilot brought more than 30 000 people to safety.69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Interview with Commanding Officer of Slovenian patrol ship SNS Triglav. 
65 Christian Jakob and Eric Bonse, “Beyond the fence: The EU is transforming Frontex into a full-service agency. It is working with shady 
governments”, Taz.de (15 December 2016); “Siem Pilot caught in rescue chaos”, News in English (24 October 2016). 
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2.3 Current difficulties in the law enforcement activities conducted on board 
 
As their mandates clarify, the two EU naval missions are aimed to combat migrant smuggling 
and they conduct similar activities. However, experiences from participating vessels show 
that the possibilities are not exploited to their full extent, and that is due to a number of 
reasons. 
 
Difficulties related to deploying vessels of many EU member states: jurisdictional issues 
Some problems are related to the deployment of vessels sailing under the flag of different EU 
member states. That brings matters of jurisdiction to the surface that both Operation Sophia 
and Operation Triton are confronted with. A first jurisdictional issue is related to the limited 
number of investigative steps that may be performed on board. That is partially due to the 
different jurisdictions and the different criminal laws that the vessels are subject to. The 
jurisdiction of a state also applies to the vessels that are sailing under its flag. It is referred to 
as the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, which provides that vessels sail under one 
state’s flag and that any activity performed by or aboard these ships falls under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that state.70 It is a form of asserting jurisdiction outside national territory that 
has often been established for the protection of human rights. In court cases, such as Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others v. Italy, states have been convicted for violating the human rights of 
migrants who were aboard vessels registered in those states.71 The principle also applies to 
law enforcement activities done on board, and on the basis of different criminal laws not 
every investigative step is legally allowed on board. Italian prosecutors cannot order foreign 
police officers to perform all police tasks they want to be performed on board of the vessels. 
They can only ask for mutual legal assistance from the states deploying their vessels in the 
EU naval missions. This problem of different jurisdictions complicating criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Salam Khadim Baghdad Al-Khafaji, “The regime of boarding ships in international maritime law”, World Maritime University 
Dissertations 184 (2006); Brian Wilson, “Human Rights and Maritime Law Enforcement”, Stanford Journal of International Law 52 2 
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investigations is referred to by the crew of vessels participating in the EU operations, by staff 
members of EUNAVFOR Med and Frontex and by Italian prosecutors.72 
Another jurisdictional issue has to do with the assertion of national jurisdiction on the high 
seas. The interception of vessels suspected of migrant smuggling on the high seas requires 
two legal bases, as outlined in the previous chapter. Firstly, the exercise of law enforcement 
powers on the high seas (also called maritime law enforcement, MLE) needs to be asserted, 
otherwise the visit of a vessel cannot be done. International law, as codified by UNCLOS, 
stipulates on which conditions the visit of a foreign-flagged or stateless vessel is permitted.73 
Secondly, migrant smuggling activities on the high seas must be considered a criminal 
offence in the flag state of the vessel wishing to conduct the interception. The Italian Navy 
gives a clear explanation of this distinction: “navies exercise MLE functions under 
international law, although interventions are carried out according to domestic law.”74 
Especially the second legal requisite has obstructed a proper functioning of Operation Triton 
and Operation Sophia. In the case of Italy, migrant smuggling on the high seas is punishable 
because the Italian judicial authorities established the link between smuggling activities on the 
high seas and the Italian territory, as explained in the first chapter. However, migrant 
smuggling activities performed on the high seas are not considered a criminal offence in 
Belgium, as the commander of a Belgian vessel deployed in Operation Sophia pointed out, 
and neither in Germany and the United Kingdom, as mentioned by Operation Commander 
Credendino.75 The vessels registered in these countries can intercept and search a suspicious 
vessel on the high seas on the basis of UN Resolution 2240, but no legal consequences can be 
attached to it: without a criminal offence, no one can be arrested and no case can be built. 
That also hampers the investigative process that could be conducted on board.76 
 
Difficulties related to deploying vessels of many EU member states: institutional differences 
The deployment of vessels subject to different jurisdictions put a limit on the kind and 
number of law enforcement activities that can be done on board. Other aspects also cause the 
law enforcement activities to differ greatly from country to country and from vessel to vessel, 	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resulting in different contributions to the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling. Some 
examples can illustrate that: 
 
- differences in the communication lines with national prosecutors: under the Italian 
navigation code, the commanding officer of a Navy ship is in direct contact with a prosecutor 
and can follow up on his instructions directly, whereas foreign vessels are sometimes more 
limited in their communication with prosecutors.77 The commander of the Italian Navy refers 
to Germany as an example. According to him, this is a crucial difference for which reasons 
the activities done by Italian flagged vessels are more effective and useful.78 
 
- differences between marine and coast guard vessels: to give Italy as an example, on Italian 
marine ships the commanding officer is the only one authorised to exercise law enforcement 
but on Italian coast guard ships, all coast guard officers are allowed to perform law 
enforcement activities. As a consequence, Italian prosecution offices state that the rapports 
they received from coast guard vessels were more valuable compared to those of marine 
ships.79  
The deployment of marine vessels in support of criminal investigations has also proven not to 
be optimal. Experts on the issue have brought forward that Operation Sophia does not always 
share the information acquired with the relevant Italian judicial authorities, and if it does, the 
shared information can be inadmissible to use in court.80 That is because, as Operation Sophia 
is a military mission and deploying military assets, many documents are immediately 
considered classified.81 Some experts also refer to obstacles when deploying military forces 
for the purpose of judicial investigations. Criminal investigations require skills and methods 
of evidence gathering that military personnel are not familiar with.82 
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Cooperation in the past: the Italian judiciary working together with Italian naval assets 
Contrary to the current situation, the cooperation between the Italian judiciary and Italian 
naval assets is not obstructed by jurisdictional differences and Italian authorities only speak 
positively about it. They refer to a number of advantages that have now disappeared.83 Italian 
flagged vessels, operating under Operation Mare Nostrum, had the legal basis to inspect and 
seize vessels suspected of migrant smuggling on the high seas and to prosecute migrant 
smugglers for committing crimes on the high seas. On this basis, the first investigative steps 
could be taken on board and Italian officers authorised to perform law enforcement activities 
were aboard the vessels to start the investigations. These officers conducted any law 
enforcement activity that was legally allowed under the Italian criminal code, and they did so 
in the appropriate form to use the evidence in court and in close communication with the 
Italian prosecutors.84 Currently, vessels belonging to the Guardia di Finanza, the Italian Navy 
and the Italian coast guard are also joining Operation Triton, EUNAVFOR Med and Mare 
Sicuro, but that doesn’t cause problems. According to the commanding officers of the Italian 
coast guard and of the Italian marine, the cooperation between the judicial authorities and 
these Italian flagged vessels proceeds in the same way as occurred previously with Operation 
Mare Nostrum.85 
 
Difficulties related to the embarkation of Italian police officers on board 
Several Italian parties recommend the embarkation of Italian police officers on board of the 
foreign vessels deployed in Operation Triton and Operation Sophia. These police officers can 
ascertain that the necessary investigative steps are taken, ensure that these steps are correctly 
taken and keep communication lines with the Italian prosecutors. As some Italian prosecutors 
argue, it would even be better if these police forces are authorised with executive powers, 
allowing the Italian police units to perform law enforcement activities by themselves under 
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Italian jurisdiction.86 Despite the advantages brought forward to bring Italian police officers 
on board, the regulations on the subject and the practical implementation show some 
shortcomings.  
 
As to Operation Triton, Frontex’ handbook to the operational plan of its missions allows for 
the presence of host liaison officers on board of the participating vessels.87 The operational 
plan of Operation Triton also mentions the possibility to deploy Italian debriefing teams on 
board of a foreign vessel, on the condition that the participating member state agrees.88 On the 
basis of these provisions, many vessels of Operation Triton have indeed embarked or still 
embark Italian officials from the Guardia di Finanza or the Italian coast guard.89 At the 
moment, the presence on board of an official of the Guardia di Finanza is even made 
obligatory, whereas the deployment of an official from the Italian coast guard is voluntary.90 
 
However, the officials from the Guardia di Finanza and from the Italian coast guard are not 
primarily focussed on the exercise of criminal investigations on board. The officials from the 
Guardia di Finanza are the representatives of the host state on board. As such, they keep 
communication lines between the commanding officer of the vessel and the International 
Coordination Centre (ICC, the structure that coordinates all assets deployed under Operation 
Triton) and they forward messages from the ICC (as to the patrolling area, targets of interest, 
etc.).91 The officials of the Italian coast guard are focussed on search and rescue missions: 
they council on correct procedures, communicate with the Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre (MRCC) and provide the link with Italian local authorities. Among the tasks assigned 
to the coast guard liaison officers, there is no mention that they are also involved in police 
actions on board.92 As sources from Italian prosecutor officers and experiences from 
participating vessels show, the embarked Italian liaison officers can be involved in the 	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detection of smugglers and the collection of evidence. But it is not their primary task and they 
are also not given executive powers to enforce the Italian law on board. It gives possibilities 
to better deploy Italian liaison officers for the purpose of law enforcement. 
 
As to Operation Sophia, in 2015 an agreement was signed between Frontex and EUNAVFOR 
Med providing for the presence of Italian liaison officers aboard.93 A spokesperson of Frontex 
has confirmed that Italian police officers are deployed on some vessels under Operation 
Sophia. They come from a pool of Italian police forces (including officers from the Guardia 
di Finanza, the Italian coast guard and the Polizia di Stato, another Italian police unit) and are 
embarked on the vessels primarily to advise on the collection and preservation of evidence.94 
That the Italian officers embarked on board of Operation Sophia are assigned to overlook 
police tasks, has to do with the differences between military and coast guard vessels. The 
coast guard vessels, deployed in Operation Triton, often have police officials from the flag 
state among the crew, whereas military vessels may not have police officials on board.95 The 
deployment of Italian liaison officers on Sophia vessels is not mandatory and has started only 
recently. Also these police officials have only an advisory and observatory role and they are 
not authorised with executive powers.96 With regard to the tasks assigned to these Italian 
liaison officers, these tasks seem to show that the liaison officers, if they are involved in law 
enforcement activities on board, have a primary focus on the detection of smugglers present 
on board and the collection of evidence aimed to bring these smugglers to trial. It leaves out 
police tasks to be conducted for the collection of information about the entire criminal 
organisations. 
 
The arrival of NGO’s 
Recent changes have further complicated the preliminary investigations aboard vessels: the 
arrival of non-governmental organisations (NGO’s). In 2016, as a response to the large 
number of migrants dying at sea, NGO’s deployed ships off the coast of Libya with the sole 
purpose of rescuing migrants at sea. They patrol on the borderline between the Libyan 
territorial waters and the international waters, whereas the vessels participating in Operation 
Sophia and Operation Triton lie much further backwards. That had consequences for the 
search and rescue operations carried out in the Mediterranean Sea: while previously NGO 	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vessels were involved in less than 5% of the incidents, now almost 50% of the rescue 
operations in the Mediterranean Sea are carried out by NGO’s, thereby reducing the efforts 
from EUNAVFOR Med and Operation Triton to respectively 10% and 12%.97 
 
These changes also affect Italy’s criminal investigations on migrant smuggling. The NGO’s 
can be requested to perform law enforcement activities on board, but each NGO decides for 
herself if and in which ways and to what extent the cooperation with the Italian authorities 
takes place. Some NGO’s were asked by the Italian authorities to assist in police 
investigations on migrant smuggling98, but most NGO’s are reluctant to provide assistance, 
limit themselves to rescue missions and leave any investigative step to the Italian 
authorities.99 The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has deliberately avoided taking any 
visual materials that could be used as evidence in court100, and Seawatch has declared to be 
willing to cooperate solely in case an Italian military vessel joins their ship.101 Now, the only 
NGO actively assisting the Italian police is the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS). 
According to the NGO’s spokesperson, MOAS is aware of the importance of both rescuing 
migrants and pursuing justice and for that reason it performs a number of law enforcement 
activities on board.  At the end of each rescue mission, the crew of MAOS compiles a rapport 
including all activities done during the rescue and any photographs taken (even drone 
footage), which is subsequently delivered to the Italian authorities.102 
 
Regarding the issue of Italian liaison officers, Italian prosecutors support the presence of 
Italian police officers on board of the NGO’s vessels.103 However, they also raise awareness 
of the obstacles that such a proposal would face; these obstacles are similar to difficulties 
encountered in the cooperation with Operation Triton and Operation Sophia and relate to the 	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different national jurisdictions that the NGO’s vessels are subject to.104 Some NGO’s were 
asked if they would accept an Italian police officer on board for conducting the first 
investigative steps. Almost all NGO’s to whom the question was asked responded negatively, 
fundamentally because the presence of police on board would undermine the humanitarian 
principles the NGO’s stand by.105 The only exception was – again – MAOS, which declared 
to be willing to allow anyone on board and who had already received officers from Frontex 
aboard.106 
 
Conclusion 
Since the end of 2014, European countries have stepped up their efforts to help Italy 
combating migrant smuggling and vessels flying the flag of different European countries 
participate in Operation Triton or Operation Sophia. The increased activities of the EU and 
European countries have positive effects, as acknowledged also by Italian prosecutors, since 
more means are being deployed and the burden on Italy has been lowered.107 However, these 
new developments also provide challenges for cooperation with the judicial authorities, due to 
the deployment of ships falling under different national jurisdictions and having different 
institutional set-ups and to the regular absence or limited competences of Italian police 
officers aboard the foreign vessels. The arrival to the scene of NGO’s has further complicated 
the joint efforts to combat migrant smuggling. On the other hand, the cooperation with only 
Italian flagged vessels had shown many advantages compared to the current situation. These 
are evidence of good practises that have partially gone lost after the start of the European 
naval missions. In order to bring the current cooperation mechanisms to a better level, more 
needs to be done: there is a need of more clarity, more unity and more equality.
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3. Improving the cooperation between EU naval missions and Italian judicial authorities 
 
This chapter wants to focus on one possibility that can improve the cooperation between the 
European naval missions and the Italian judicial authorities: the establishment of so-called 
shiprider agreements. Shipriders are police officials of one state that are embarked on a naval 
ship of another state, and who, on the basis of an agreement between the two states, are 
authorised to enforce the law of their home state while present on the naval ship of the other 
state. Agreements like these may be of interest to Operation Triton and Operation Sophia. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the missions deploy ships falling under different national 
jurisdictions and that has complicated the cooperation with the Italian authorities. However, 
although the use of shipriders in Operation Triton and Operation Sophia was discussed on 
some occasions, some parties involved considered it as a possibility to solve current 
difficulties and Operation Sophia’s Operation Commander Credendino mentioned the 
possible use of Libyan shipriders when the operation enters into Libyan territorial waters, 
none of them and neither academic researchers have looked into detail at the subject.108 
Academic research has given attention to shiprider agreements arranged in the past, but there 
is a complete lack of references to the use of shipriders in the context of Operation Triton and 
Operation Sophia.  
 
Therefore, this chapter wants to explore how shiprider agreements can be best applied in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Since this study is focussed on the cooperation between the EU missions 
and the Italian authorities, and since it is not likely that Operation Sophia will operate within 
Libyan territorial waters in the near future, this chapter focuses on the possibilities of Italian 
shipriders on board of Triton and Sophia vessels. The chapter starts with a definition of 
shipriders, the legal implications of their deployment and their usefulness for the purpose of 
combating crime. After that, the second part clarifies how shiprider agreements in the past 
looked like, how they transferred jurisdiction from one state to another and for which purpose 
the agreements were concluded. These examples show what is possible from a legal point of 
view, and on that basis, in the third part, it can be explored how the use of shipriders can be 
applied to Operation Triton and Operation Sophia.
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Explaining shiprider agreements, their legal implications and their usefulness 
As just mentioned, shiprider agreements authorise police officials of one state to enforce their 
national law on the naval ship of another state. These police officials, that are embarked on 
the foreign ship, are called shipriders or law enforcement detachment teams (LEDET’s). Such 
agreements result in interesting jurisdictional changes on board of a vessel. Basically, the 
assertion of jurisdiction changes: whereas normally vessels fall under the jurisdiction of their 
flag state, now the vessels are temporarily and under specific circumstances subject to the 
national jurisdiction of another state.109 The existence and legal possibility of arrangements 
such as these is an example of the broadened concept of jurisdiction. Although the notion of 
jurisdiction was exclusively territorial in the past, as referred to in the first chapter, exceptions 
are increasingly carved out in customary law that allow for the assertion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as well.110 In the case of shiprider agreements, exceptional situations are created 
on board of a vessel in which practically law enforcement entities from two different 
countries are present and able to enforce the laws of the two countries, resulting in areas of 
overlapping and concurrent jurisdictions. In most ship rider agreements, the flag state waives 
its jurisdiction and permits another state to exercise full jurisdiction over its ship, which is 
then called a jurisdictional transfer or jurisdiction swapping.111 
 
These jurisdictional transfers, made possible by shiprider agreements, give the notion of 
jurisdiction a very porous nature but allow for a range of possibilities. As will be shown 
below in further detail, they can especially be useful in the fight against organised crime. It 
can solve some problems related to jurisdictional boundaries that law enforcement agencies 
have come across. These jurisdictional boundaries are related to the concept of national 
jurisdiction. The concept of national jurisdiction authorises a state to enforce the law within 
its territorial boundaries, as explained in the first chapter, but also implies that a state cannot 
project its power into the jurisdiction of another state. A state can only conduct police tasks 
within the jurisdiction of another state after the express consent of that state. In the fight 
against organised crime, law enforcement agencies have encountered three jurisdictional 
boundaries that caused problems: they are not allowed to enter the territorial waters of another 
state, they are not allowed to take coercive measures against a foreign-flagged vessel (save for 	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exceptional circumstances as drawn up in international law), and they cannot conduct police 
actions on board of a foreign-flagged vessel.  
 
 
3.1. Shiprider agreements concluded in the past for three purposes 
 
Crossing territorial waters 
That the entry of another state’s territorial sea cannot be conducted without the express 
consent of that state, is a problem in the fight against the smuggling of drugs, that often takes 
place on sea. The territorial waters are an area over which the coastal state has sovereignty. 
Vessels of the coastal state can enter its territorial waters, but vessels of another state may 
enter the territorial waters or exercise police tasks within them only after the consent of that 
coastal state.112 Therefore, smugglers can easily pass the maritime border line separating the 
territorial waters of two states but the border line obliges law enforcement agencies to stop 
while pursuing a suspected vessel and wait for consent before continuing the chase. Shiprider 
agreements can be established in order to deny smugglers getting away with their illegal 
activities.113 Under a shiprider agreement, designated police officers of coastal state B are 
embarked aboard vessels sailing under flag state A and assert jurisdiction over the foreign-
flagged vessel, and then the vessel can freely pass into the territorial sea of coastal state B. 
The state pursuing a suspected vessel into the other state’s territorial waters can be entrusted 
with the whole operation, including the seizure of the suspect vessel, the arrest of the 
smugglers and further criminal investigations on board. The chasing party can also stop the 
suspected vessel and wait until the coastal state’s law enforcement authorities arrive and take 
over the investigation. In order to better combat the smuggling of illegal goods between 
adjacent territorial waters, shiprider agreements were concluded between the United States 
and Canada, in which case American and Canadian vessels had law enforcement officers from 
both countries aboard who were authorised to enforce the law on both sides of the shared 
American – Canadian marine border.114 The United States have also concluded shiprider 
agreements with Jamaica and Panama to allow for the pursuit of suspected vessels into their 
territorial waters.115 
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Interception of foreign vessels in international waters 
The fight against the smuggling of drugs also takes place on the high seas, and in this 
maritime zone patrolling states may wish to visit and search a foreign-flagged vessel 
suspected of carrying drugs. In order to curb irregular migration flows, states also may want 
to intercept boats filled with migrants on the high seas.116 However, the legal order on the 
high seas, as drawn up in UNCLOS, stipulates that no state has sovereignty over the high seas 
and that a state only asserts jurisdiction over the vessels flying its flag.117 As a consequence, 
save exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties118, any coercive 
measure against a vessel flying another state’s flag is only allowed upon prior authorisation of 
that flag state. A shiprider agreement between state A, that patrols a part of the high seas, and 
state B, under whose flag many drugs smuggling boats or migrant boats are sailing, could 
solve this situation. The shiprider of state B is on board of a vessel sailing under flag state A 
and can conduct or authorise the boarding of a vessel sailing under state B.119 Under such 
agreements, it has been common for state B to give the boarding state consent to continue 
with the investigations of criminal offences discovered aboard.120 Agreements such as these 
have been completed between the United States and the United Kingdom that were aimed to 
“obviate the necessity of requesting individual authorisations from the United Kingdom for 
U.S enforcement authorities to board ships under the British flag.”121 Agreements aimed to 
intercept migrant boats were agreed between Italy and several North-African countries. Under 
so-called “push-back” operations, migrant boats were intercepted on the high seas by Italy 
and returned to the country where they came from.122 These operations have however 
received a lot of criticism, because they violated the principle of non-refoulement.123 
 
On board of flagged vessels within territorial waters and on the high seas 
In the previous paragraphs, shiprider agreements were primarily concluded for two reasons: to 
allow state A to cross the territorial waters of state B or to allow state A to intercept vessels 
sailing under state B, made possible by the embarkation of a shiprider of state B. However, 
after the crossing of the territorial waters and the subsequent interception of the pursued 	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vessel and after the interception of a foreign vessel on the high seas, it remains to be asked 
which of the two states proceeds with the criminal investigations. If suspects were found on 
board of the intercepted vessel, which state conducts the arrest and which state continues with 
the further gathering of evidence on board: the flag state or the shiprider’s state? This 
question brings to the fore a third way of deploying shipriders: by authorising them to conduct 
criminal investigations on board of a foreign vessel. 
 
A state is not allowed to assert jurisdiction and to exercise law enforcement on board of 
foreign vessels. That is determined by the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, 
implying, as explained in the previous chapter, that a vessel falls under the jurisdiction of its 
flag state and that everything that happens on board remains subject to the national laws of the 
flag state.124 However, shiprider agreements can allow the flag state to transfer jurisdiction 
over the events occurring on board to another state, including the jurisdiction over law 
enforcement activities conducted on board. It means that shipriders from state B, although 
embarked on a foreign vessel sailing under state A, have the power to exercise police tasks on 
board and to do that in accordance with their national law. Fundamentally, the flag state 
waives jurisdiction over its own vessel and hands it over to another state. Referring back to 
the examples from the previous paragraph, this kind of jurisdiction swapping takes place 
when the shiprider’s state (B) proceeds with the criminal investigations on board of the flag 
state (A). Many concluded shiprider agreements arrange for these types of jurisdiction 
transfers on board of a vessel. Next to the examples mentioned in the previous paragraphs, 
shiprider agreements like these were brought forward in the past for two important reasons: in 
West-Africa to assist coastal states with border control, and off the coast of Somalia to 
combat piracy. 
 
In West Africa, some coastal states lacked the naval assets to effectively control and secure 
their borders. Other countries showed their willingness to provide assistance but they did not 
want the burden of arresting and prosecuting criminal offenders as well. Shiprider agreements 
allowed the coastal state to enforce only its own law and still receive support in border control 
from other states, while the supporting states could provide assistance but were saved from 
the obligation and costs of judicial investigations and prosecutions. Such agreements were 
signed between Spain and Cape Verde, whereby Cape Verdean police officers were placed on 	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board of Spanish vessels patrolling in Cape Verdean waters and coercive measures were 
either carried out by Cape Verde or by Spain but under the direction of Cape Verde.125 Spain 
also completed similar agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.126 Subsequently, Frontex’ 
Operation Hera, that implemented these bilateral agreements, made the embarkation of 
Senegalese and Mauritanian police officials obligatory for all vessels deployed by the 
participating EU Member States. Similarly to the agreement with Cape Verde, these police 
officials fell under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Senegal/Mauritania and decided 
exclusively upon interceptions, visits, arrests, etc.127 Italy has completed similar agreements 
with Libya in order to combat irregular migration.128  
 
In the Horn of Africa, shiprider agreements were suggested to solve a jurisdictional stalemate 
in which case both the coastal state and the flag state – or on the high seas the seized state and 
the seizing state – did not have the capacity or the willingness to prosecute pirates and another 
third state was prepared to take over the task and fill the void.129 Extradition procedures 
already allow for the transfer of a suspect from one jurisdiction to another, but then the 
gathering of evidence may not have been conducted by the prosecuting state from the 
beginning, whereas shiprider agreements allow third state’s police officers to gather evidence 
from the start. In the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, multilateral naval missions 
(including the EU’s Operation Atalanta) were undertaken and multiple governments were 
able to assert jurisdiction: the country where the pirates came from (Somalia), the countries 
that had the seized ships registered (Liberia, Panama and the Marshall Islands) and the 
country that seized the suspect ships (the United States, India, EU member states). But since 
no government was capable or interested to prosecute pirates, they were recurrently 
released.130 As a solution, resolution 1851 of the UN Security Council encouraged 
participating states to conclude special agreements with countries that were willing to 
prosecute pirates and to embark shipriders from the latter countries.131 The European 	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Council’s joint action of the mission does not mention the practise of shipriders but does 
however allow for the transfer of arrested persons to another EU member state or to another 
third state willing to exercise jurisdiction.132 On this legal basis, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the EU, Canada and some other countries have concluded bilateral agreements with 
Kenya, which allowed for the transfer of captured pirate suspects.133 However, there is no 
evidence of the embarkation of Kenyan shipriders on board of the foreign vessels.134 The 
exchange of letters between the EU and Kenya, that is made public, stipulates the procedures 
for the transfer of apprehended pirates but does not mention shipriders.135 Therefore, despite 
the legal possibilities and the support from the UN and the EU, the use of shipriders seems to 
have happened rarely. 
 
Different formats of shiprider agreements   
As these examples show, a number of shiprider agreements were arranged in the past and they 
can take different forms. Shiprider agreements show different formats in the powers assigned 
to the shipriders. A first difference lies in the activities the shipriders are authorised to 
perform: shipriders may merely be limited to authorise the entry into another state’s territorial 
waters but they can also be permitted to perform any law enforcement activity on board, as 
long as these are in accordance with their state’s national law. Secondly, they may only 
conduct the law enforcement activities themselves (in which case they conduct the boarding 
of a foreign vessel or perform the criminal investigations on board), or they can also have the 
authority to command the flag state’s personnel and vessels, who then conduct law 
enforcement activities under the other state’s direction and under the other state’s national 
law. A third variable regards the extent of jurisdiction swapping: two states can share 
enforcement powers or one of the two state authorities is granted full permission to enforce its 
own law. In the first case, law enforcement detachments of two countries are aboard and the 
state authorities decide, on a case-by-case basis, which of the two states asserts jurisdiction 
and conducts the boarding and further criminal investigations on board. In the second case, 	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the flag state has totally waived jurisdiction and the police officers of the second state are 
empowered to enforce their national law. It depends on the terms of the agreement what kind 
of activities and competences are assigned to the shipriders. Depending on the content of the 
agreement, there may even not be a shiprider aboard. In that case, the consent to cross 
territorial waters, to board a foreign vessel or to enforce the other state’s national law on 
board is given in advance to another state and no further authorisation is needed.136 One 
aspect is however fundamental in the stipulation of any shiprider agreement: the state that 
waves its jurisdiction sets the terms. 
 
 
3.2 Applying shiprider agreements to Operation Triton and Operation Sophia  
 
Just as shiprider agreements were arranged in the past to better combat organised crime, they 
can improve the functioning of Operation Triton and Operation Sophia as well. As clarified in 
the previous chapter, Italian prosecutors have emphasised how important it is to conduct the 
first investigative steps on board: not solely for the apprehension of smugglers, but more 
importantly for the gathering of information and evidence about higher levelled smugglers. 
Now, the police tasks executed on board are often solely focussed on the detection of 
smugglers among the migrants, not every police task is performed that could ideally be 
conducted and as a consequence important evidence might get lost. The number of law 
enforcement activities conducted on board also differs substantially between the vessels. The 
limited number of police tasks conducted on board and the differences between the 
participating vessels are mainly due to the deployment of vessels falling under different 
national jurisdictions with different criminal laws, and that has complicated the cooperation 
with the Italian prosecution offices. The current deployment of Italian liaison officers on 
board does neither solve these jurisdictional difficulties, because they have only an advisory 
and observatory role and do not have executive powers. 
 
The deployment of shipriders would provide a solution. In the context of the EU naval 
missions, shiprider agreements would best be implemented that transfer the jurisdiction over a 
vessel from the flag state to another state, namely Italy (the third form of the examples 
mentioned above). Under such an agreement, Italian police officers are embarked on board of 
the Triton and Sophia vessels and authorised to conduct police tasks under Italian law. With 	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these competences, they can not only conduct any police task as long as these are in 
compliance with Italian law, but they can also ensure that the same police tasks are performed 
on each vessel, making the criminal investigations on board of Triton and Sophia vessels of 
an equal level. It would bring the cooperation of the Italian prosecution offices with EU naval 
missions back to their previous level of cooperation with the Italian naval missions. Just as the 
gathering of evidence aboard the Italian vessels was performed by Italian authorities in Italian 
jurisdiction and under Italian criminal law, the same provisions apply to the deployment of 
shipriders on board of Triton and Sophia vessels. And in analogy with Frontex Operation 
Hera, Italy can still enforce its own law in Italian territorial waters and even on the high seas, 
but at the same time be provided with naval assets from other EU member states to help with 
border control and rescue missions. In relation to concluded shiprider agreements in the past, 
it does not even seem anomalous to apply the same concept to Operation Triton and 
Operation Sophia. Fundamentally, shiprider agreements make it possible that the country 
willing to prosecute a criminal offender is present from the moment suspects are apprehended 
and the gathering of evidence can start. In the context of Operation Triton and Operation 
Sophia, arrangements have been made with Italy providing for the transfer of any suspect to 
Italy137, but without allowing Italian police officials to collect evidence under Italian law on 
board of the vessels. The embarkation of Italian shipriders would solve this current 
shortcoming as well. 
 
Feasibility of shiprider agreements in the context of Operation Triton and Operation Sophia 
The embarkation of Italian police officials as shipriders has many benefits. But there is one 
crucial question: is it feasible? Can Operation Triton and Operation Sophia have the legal 
basis to deploy Italian shipriders on board of the participating vessels? Next to that, are the 
EU member states participating in the missions willing to allow shipriders on board and to 
waive their jurisdiction? 
 
As concluded shiprider agreements in the past show, the lawfulness of a shiprider agreement 
is based on the agreement of two states: one state has to be willing to take over criminal 
investigations in an extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the other state must grant its permission to 
waive its jurisdiction. There is one additional requirement: the agreement has to be put on 
paper. For that purpose, even relatively informal agreements, such as memoranda of 	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understanding and an exchange of letters, are enough to demonstrate the required consent.138 
As the example of Frontex operation Hera showed, shiprider agreements can also be arranged 
with a political entity, such as the EU. Therefore, as long as Italy and the participating 
member state agree on the deployment of shipriders, the Italian police officials can be 
embarked and they can perform police tasks under Italian law. On the basis of the necessary 
requirements, shipriders can be embarked both on vessels operating under Operation Triton 
and on vessels operating under Operation Sophia. Actually, both the EEAS (that launches EU 
military missions) and Frontex are already familiar with the legal possibilities of shipriders. In 
the joint action of Operation Atalanta, the EU recommended the transfer of arrested persons 
to another EU member state or to another third state. And in Operation Hera, Frontex made 
the embarkation of Senegalese and Mauritanian police officials obligatory for all participating 
EU Member States. 
 
From the viewpoint of participating EU member states, there seems to be no need to raise 
objections because the presence of Italian shipriders does not significantly change the current 
situation. EU member states that deploy their vessels do not arrest and prosecute detected 
smugglers now and they will not do that under a shiprider agreement. If, under the agreement, 
the shiprider is not granted authorisation to command the crew of the flag state, the crew of 
the flag state does neither need to assist the Italian shipriders. Interestingly, some 
commanders of vessels participating in Operation Triton and Operation Sophia also support 
the presence of Italian police officers aboard and the allocation of more executive power to 
thems. They agree it would facilitate the investigative process aboard and solve current 
jurisdictional issues.139 And even if some EU member states object to the embarkation of 
shipriders, as some EU member states did neither request for the deployment of an Italian 
coast guard officer140, that should not restrain Italian authorities and the EU naval missions 
from arranging and offering it. The deployment of shipriders can be provided on a voluntary 
basis. 
 
Although shiprider agreements can theoretically be arranged with Operation Triton and 
Operation Sophia, it seems most feasible to start the deployment of shipriders under 
Operation Triton. That is due to a number of reasons. That is firstly because of the command 	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structure of the operation. The command and control of a Frontex joint operation remains 
with the host member state, which implies that the host state has a large say in operational 
matters. As the EU Regulation on the European border and Coast Guard (which replaces 
Frontex) states, “any amendments to or adaptations of the operational plan shall require the 
agreement of the executive director and the host member state, after consultation of the 
participating member states.”141 Italy is allowed to make a request, such as for the 
embarkation of Italian shipriders on board of Triton vessels, which is then forwarded to the 
legal department of Frontex. If the request is legally feasible and if the executive director 
agrees, amendments can be made to the operational plan.142 
 
By providing for the deployment of Italian shipriders on board, Operation Triton would also 
continue a line of experiments with embarking liaison officers. Operation Triton started with 
the deployment of Italian officials from the Guardia di Finanza, who represented the host 
member state of the operation, and made the embarkation obligatory for participating vessels. 
After that, the operation started experiencing with the embarkation of officials from the Italian 
coast guard, which is on a voluntary basis. Since recently, as referred to in the previous 
chapter, Frontex also deploys Italian police officials to vessels participating in Operation 
Sophia, who have an advisory and observatory role in the detection of smugglers. In this line 
of developments, it seems a logical next step to deploy Italian police officers with executive 
powers on board of Triton vessels: than can be done firstly on a voluntary basis, then on a 
mandatory basis and after that Frontex can second Italian shipriders to Operation Sophia. 
 
Conclusion 
As shiprider agreements from the past show, they have especially been useful in the fight 
against organised crime. By taking over a different jurisdiction – thus by concluding shiprider 
agreements –, state authorities are able to enter another state’s territorial waters, to board 
foreign-flagged vessels and to enforce the national law in foreign territory whether it is on 
board of a foreign vessel or within foreign territorial waters. In doing so, shipriders are 
efficient and timesaving when pursuing a suspect vessel in shared waterways and they are 
essential when combating a crime in a state that is incapable or unwilling to do so by herself. 
Shiprider-agreements can be used to collect evidence in accordance with the prosecuting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Council of the European Union and European Parliament, Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
142 Interview with coordinating officer of Frontex.	  
 45	  
state’s evidentiary rules, thereby saving on complicated procedures of international 
cooperation in which two laws are enforced, including procedures such as mutual legal 
assistance requests. They also enable states to prosecute an offender if they are willing to, 
even if the criminal offence is not conducted within national territory. As such, they allow 
decisions related to the investigation and prosecution of offenders to be based on where and 
by whom they can most effectively be conducted, instead of where they are legally obliged to 
be conducted. Such a history of shiprider agreements for the purpose of law enforcement 
shows that it is legally possible to introduce the concept in the context of Operation Triton 
and Operation Sophia, and the previous chapter has made clear that the EU naval missions 
would benefit from such a shiprider agreement. 
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Recommendations and conclusion 
 
According to experts, massive migration flows heading towards Europe will remain a 
common phenomenon for decades to come. The refugee crisis of the last years is just the 
beginning, as they argue, and we have to grow accustomed to these flows of migrants.143 It is 
assumed that one million migrants are currently waiting in Libya to cross the Mediterranean 
Sea. Continuous underdevelopment in Africa, a rise in population and climatic changes 
reducing the size of fertile ground are the main reasons why millions of other Africans are 
expected to start their journey towards Europe in the future.144 And since legal pathways to 
enter Europe are very scarce at the moment, probably won’t increase that much in the near 
future and certainly can never be used by all Africans wishing to emigrate, the smuggling 
networks will have enough business in the coming decades as well. Accordingly, the fight 
against migrant smuggling and against all those crimes that are strongly interwoven with the 
smuggling business – ranging from rape, imprisonment, torture and death by drowning – has 
also just started and will continue to be a pressing issue for the law enforcement and judicial 
authorities, both in Italy, probably increasingly so in other European countries and for the EU. 
Against this background of ever continuing illegal migration flows and enduringly strong 
criminal networks, it is of great importance to look back on the first years of large-scale 
judicial investigation on migrant smuggling and to identity difficulties and good practises. In 
that way, current and future judicial investigations can be performed better. 
 
These first years of anti-smuggling investigation are characterised by two aspects: they show 
that the EU has become increasingly interested to combat the smuggling business and that 
Italy is the EU member state starting the first large judicial investigations and putting most 
efforts in the prosecution of suspected smugglers. Therefore, in order for the EU to better 
combat migrant smugglers in the future, it is useful to look upon the Italian investigations of 
the last years. This study has looked upon two ways for the EU to bring the judicial 
investigation to a higher level: (1) how can the EU improve the investigations on migrant 
smuggling of other EU member states, based on Italy’s good practises, and (2) how can the 
EU further support the Italian investigations on migrant smuggling, by ensuring a better 
support of Operation Triton and Operation Sophia? 	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144 Ibidem. 
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Improving judicial investigations of EU member states, based on Italy’s good practises 
A closer look at Italy’s investigations on migrant smuggling, including their starting points, 
methods used and legal provisions introduced, has not only shown their effectiveness but also 
gives us lessons to learn from these Italian practises. What can the EU do with these lessons? 
The EU can legally allow and facilitate the use of methods proved to be effective in the Italian 
investigations, in anti-smuggling investigations of other EU member states. These are then 
practically modelled on the investigations performed by the Italian judiciary. As the first 
chapter showed, two practises proved to be especially important that other EU member states 
can take over: the focus on high-level figures in the criminal organisations and the use of 
migrant testimonies. In order for other member states to change their focus, it can already be 
helpful if the EU changes the legal definition of the facilitation of irregular entry and includes 
the aspect of financial gain. The EU can also better support the collection of migrant 
testimonies, for example by abolishing illegal entry into a EU member state as a criminal 
offence and by allocating funds for witness protection programmes. For this purpose, the EU 
can also establish firm rules about the rights of victims of migrant smuggling, about their 
benefits if they cooperate with the judicial authorities and about the use of their testimonies in 
court, as Italy has already done in cases of migrant smuggling and as the EU directive on the 
trafficking in human beings does with reference to victims of this offence.145 Next to these 
proposals, the EU can legitimise the use of advanced methods as a means to gather evidence 
and perhaps urge for the setting up of specialised teams of prosecutors in each EU member 
state to address migrant smuggling, so that the EU member states will put more efforts into 
anti-smuggling investigations. Provisions such as these and others can be arranged by 
establishing a EU Directive on Smuggling, as proposed by Italian experts as well.146 By 
choosing this line and by implementing such a directive, the EU would also follow on the EU 
Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling, and especially on two provisions that are aimed to 
improve the prosecution of smugglers – and to which I referred in the introduction: enhancing 
the capacities of EU member states to investigate and prosecute migrant smuggling networks 
and improving the existing EU legal framework and the penal framework. 
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Further supporting the Italian investigations 
The Italian practises show which steps the EU can take to improve anti-smuggling 
investigations of other EU member states. They also clarify how the EU can better support the 
Italian investigations on migrant smuggling. Firstly, the EU can give further support by 
providing more operative and financial means. European agencies such as Europol, Eurojust 
and Frontex already give operational support in Italy’s hotspots, which can be further 
expanded.147 Italian prosecutors also point to a lack of professional translators and interpreters 
needed for the interception of cell phones and the interviews with migrants.148 In order to 
solve that, a list should be made including the names of qualified persons who can be called 
upon any moment, and such a list could be established at the European level. 
 
More importantly, as the second and third chapter clarified into detail, the EU can provide for 
a better cooperation between Operation Triton and EUNAVFOR Med and the Italian 
authorities: by deploying Italian shipriders on board of Triton and EUNAVFOR Med vessels. 
Italian prosecutors emphasise the importance of a number of police tasks to be performed on 
board, but these cannot be conducted: either because the criminal code of the flag state does 
not allow certain investigative steps to be conducted and/or because the criminal code of the 
flag state does not penalise migrant smuggling on the high seas. The embarkation of Italian 
shipriders would solve the jurisdictional issues impeding other member states’ crew to 
conduct law enforcement activities, as mentioned above, and eliminate the need to ask for 
mutual legal assistance requests. That is crucial to make sure no evidence gets lost and to get 
as many information as possible, both about the smugglers present on board and about the 
high-level smugglers based in the African mainland. 
 
Facilitating EU member states and EU institutions to take over criminal investigations 
The analysis of the investigations of the Italian prosecution offices and of their cooperation 
with Operation Triton and Operation Sophia reveals a third possibility for the EU to improve 
the prosecution of migrant smugglers: enabling EU member states or European institutions to 
take over the prosecution of smugglers active along the Central Mediterranean Route. 
Currently, Italy is the only country prosecuting smugglers who offer their business along this 	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route. But that is an impossible situation to last forever. Just as the country needs help to deal 
with the migratory pressure, with over 85 000 migrants having arrived at its shores this 
year149, the prosecution of the criminal offenders behind these flows can neither be left to 
Italy alone. 
 
As mentioned before, the EU can improve the anti-smuggling investigations of EU member 
states by allowing methods used in Italian investigations. However, current obstacles 
complicate their efforts to start investigations on smugglers active along the route from Libya 
to Italy. And as much as shiprider agreements are beneficial for the Italian investigations on 
migrant smuggling, they don’t relieve the burden of Italy either. Another aspect would help to 
solve these obstacles and to increase the involvement of other EU member states: invoking 
universal jurisdiction over the smuggling and trafficking of human beings. Italian authorities 
have already brought forward this idea and mentioned its usefulness to release the burden of 
Italy.150 This part wants to elaborate on their idea and bring forward additional suggestions 
how the universal jurisdiction of migrant smuggling can be applied. 
 
The assertion of universal jurisdiction allows any state to prosecute an individual, wherever 
he is caught and whether or not there is any link with the prosecuting state. There is no need 
to assert national jurisdiction, meaning that the suspect does not need to be a national of the 
state, does not have to commit a crime in the state’s territory or against its nationals, and does 
neither have to affect negatively the state’s national interests. Universal jurisdiction is 
asserted to serious crimes against international law, such as crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, genocide and torture. They are so heinous and universally condemned that the sole 
nature of the crime suffices to bring the suspects to trial. Piracy also falls under universal 
jurisdiction.151 
 
In the case of migrant smuggling, there are solid grounds to consider it a crime against 
humanity, but currently the smuggling and trafficking of human beings are transnational 
crimes. If they are afforded universal jurisdiction as crimes against humanity, any state can 	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arrest and try a person suspected of migrant smuggling, wherever the smuggling acts took 
place. It paves the way for other EU member states, the EU and the international community 
to take over criminal investigations on migrant smuggling along the Central Mediterranean 
Route. Firstly, under a universal jurisdictional basis, flag states would be provided with the 
legal basis to intercept migrant vessels on the high seas, to pursue any activity on board aimed 
to gather evidence and to prosecute the offenders.152 The universal jurisdiction does not 
change the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction and, as a consequence, does not alter 
anything about which law enforcement activities are allowed to be conducted on a vessel 
under the flag state’s law and which are not. But it would solve the jurisdictional issue that 
some EU member states came across: that they could not start criminal investigations against 
apprehended smugglers on the high seas, because migrant smuggling on the high seas is not a 
criminal offence under national law. The universal jurisdiction does not only provide flag 
states with the legal basis to prosecute apprehended suspects, but also allows shiprider 
agreements to be put to greater use: shipriders do not necessarily have to come from Italy any 
more, but can also come from any other EU member state that is willing to assert jurisdiction 
and prosecute the apprehended smugglers. Such arrangements were also mentioned with 
respect to piracy, where a shiprider of a third state (for example Kenya) could be embarked on 
one of the vessels participating in the multilateral anti-piracy missions. 
 
If recognised as a crime against humanity with universal jurisdiction, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) can be invoked as well to take over the criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.153 On the basis of agreements made between the ICC and EUNAVFOR Med, 
any evidence gathered by the missions can then be handed over to the international court. It 
would not be the first time for a military mission to assist in the collection of evidence. As the 
ICC is not supported by a police force of its own but dependent on nation states and 
international organisations to collect the evidence, military missions have also been deployed 
for this purpose. As such, the UN mission MONUC/MONUSCO collected evidence of war 
crimes committed in Congo for the International Criminal court. A Memorandum of 
Understanding, signed between the ICC and MONUC/MONUSCO, stipulated the forms of 
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cooperation, which included the arrest and transfer of suspects, the search of crime scenes and 
the seizure of objects.154 
 
In order for universal jurisdiction to be asserted, a member of the UN Security Council has to 
come up with a proposal and upon that basis the UN Security Council adopts a resolution 
addressing the issue or orders the International Criminal Court to see to it.155 Even if the UN 
Security Council does not reach consensus on the universal jurisdiction basis, the EU can 
make arrangements to enable a larger involvement of other EU member states nonetheless: by 
establishing the nexus between the crimes of migrant smuggling and the territory of the EU. It 
can be stated that migrant smuggling has final effects on the whole territory of the EU, and on 
that basis the EU can assert jurisdiction in international waters.156 That brings the subject back 
to how the EU can improve the prosecution of migrant smugglers. 
 
European combat against migrant smuggling 
These are the recommendations provided by this study for an improved fight against the 
migrant smuggling business by the EU. Which of these steps the EU decides to follow on, lies 
in the hand of the authorities of the EU and the leaders of the EU member states. But 
whatever path will be chosen for, first and foremost the EU has to do more. The smuggling 
business has grown to such proportions, has become so extremely lucrative and has also 
become so vile and violent that an appropriate European response is highly necessary. In the 
last years, Italy’s prosecution offices took the lead and now they can show the EU the way 
how to respond better. There are several ways to respond: by following Italy’s example and 
trying to apply her good practises in the rest of the EU, by better supporting the efforts of the 
Italian prosecution offices and by transferring the Italian investigations to the EU level. With 
a better response, the Italian combat against migrant smuggling can ultimately – and 
hopefully – be changed into a European one. 
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